BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_of_forall_virtualSurplus_le
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Pointwise virtual-surplus dominance lifts to ex-ante dominance.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_of_forall_virtualSurplus_le [Fintype I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) {x y : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ} (hx_int : A.IntegrableVirtualSurplus x) (hy_int : A.IntegrableVirtualSurplus y) (hxy : ∀ t, A.virtualSurplus x t ≤ A.virtualSurplus y t) : A.expectedVirtualSurplus x ≤ A.expectedVirtualSurplus y
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_of_forall_virtualSurplus_le`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_of_forall_virtualSurplus_le← BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_of_forall_virtualSurplus_le (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:136): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 17
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplusEx-ante expected virtual surplus under the auction prior.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IntegrableVirtualSurplusIntegrability condition for ex-ante virtual surplus under the auction prior.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusVirtual surplus of an allocation rule at a reported type profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRuleEx-ante virtual-surplus optimality of the deterministic rule, conditional on the explicit integrability assumptions needed by the Bochner…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in /-- Pointwise virtual-surplus dominance lifts to ex-ante dominance. -/ theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_of_forall_virtualSurplus_le [Fintype I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) {x y : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ} (hx_int : A.IntegrableVirtualSurplus x) (hy_int : A.IntegrableVirtualSurplus y) (hxy : ∀ t, A.virtualSurplus x t ≤ A.virtualSurplus y t) : A.expectedVirtualSurplus x ≤ A.expectedVirtualSurplus y := integral_mono hx_int hy_int hxy