BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_winningVirtualValue
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_winningVirtualValue
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in lemma BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_winningVirtualValue [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) {x : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ} {b : I → ℝ} (hx_nonneg : ∀ i, 0 ≤ x b i) (hx_capacity : (∑ i, x b i) ≤ 1) (hwin_nonneg : 0 ≤ A.winningVirtualValue b) : A.virtualSurplus x b ≤ A.winningVirtualValue b
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_winningVirtualValue`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_winningVirtualValue← BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_winningVirtualValue (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:409): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 26
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_totalAllocation_mul_winningVirtualValueBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_totalAllocation_mul_winningVirtualValue
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValueThe virtual value attained by the selected virtual-value winner.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusVirtual surplus of an allocation rule at a reported type profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRulePointwise virtual-surplus maximality.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} inlemma BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_winningVirtualValue [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) {x : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ} {b : I → ℝ} (hx_nonneg : ∀ i, 0 ≤ x b i) (hx_capacity : (∑ i, x b i) ≤ 1) (hwin_nonneg : 0 ≤ A.winningVirtualValue b) : A.virtualSurplus x b ≤ A.winningVirtualValue b := by calc A.virtualSurplus x b ≤ (∑ i, x b i) * A.winningVirtualValue b := A.virtualSurplus_le_totalAllocation_mul_winningVirtualValue hx_nonneg _ ≤ 1 * A.winningVirtualValue b := mul_le_mul_of_nonneg_right hx_capacity hwin_nonneg _ = A.winningVirtualValue b := by ring