BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in @[simp] theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : (A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction).allocationRule = A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule← BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:272): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 20
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRuleAllocates to the highest positive virtual value, otherwise withholds the item.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuctionThe Bayesian auction using the virtual-surplus mechanism and the original priors.
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 158
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsZeroNormalizedZero normalization for a Bayesian single-item auction's payment rule: reporting
0gives payment0, holding the other reports fixed. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRuleEx-ante virtual-surplus optimality of the deterministic rule, conditional on the explicit integrability assumptions needed by the Bochner…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_winningVirtualValueBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_winningVirtualValue
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_nonpos_of_forall_lt_reserveThresholdIf all reports are below reserve, the winning virtual value is nonpositive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsOnTypeSupportAgent
i's type lies in[0, ωᵢ]. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasEnvelopeVirtualSurplusUpperBoundEnvelope-term revenue is bounded by interim virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_pos_of_hasPositiveDensityOnSupport_of_profileInteriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_pos_of_hasPositiveDensityOnSupport_of_profileInterior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_ennreal_ofReal_aemeasurableBayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_ennreal_ofReal_aemeasurable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmongRevenueComparableRevenue optimality among revenue-comparable candidates.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuctionRegular Myerson optimality among feasible IC/IR mechanisms.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_interim_virtual_surplus_density_integrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_interim_virtual_surplus_density_integrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.integrableVirtualSurplusBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.integrableVirtualSurplus
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentityEx-ante virtual surplus agrees with the interim expression.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winningVirtualValue_pos_of_measurable_virtualValuesBayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winningVirtualValue_pos_of_measurable_virtualValues
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isOnTypeProfileSupport_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.isOnTypeProfileSupport_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValue_pos_of_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_oneA bidder allocated probability
1has positive virtual value. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.TypeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.toInterimFubiniBayesianSingleItemAuction.TypeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.toInterimFubini
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueUpperBounded_of_isRevenueComparableBayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueUpperBounded_of_isRevenueComparable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_isAllocFeasibleThe virtual-surplus-maximizing mechanism is allocation-feasible.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasPositiveDensityOnSupportDensities are positive on support interiors.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_update_self_of_winnerBayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_update_self_of_winner
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.toPaymentInterimFubiniBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.toPaymentInterimFubini
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasMyersonPaymentRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentityMyerson-payment revenue equals expected virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isOnTypeSupport_rightBayesianSingleItemAuction.isOnTypeSupport_right
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptionsCDF assumptions for the interim virtual-surplus comparison.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_totalAllocation_mul_winningVirtualValueBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_totalAllocation_mul_winningVirtualValue
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScore_update_self_mono_of_isRegularBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScore_update_self_mono_of_isRegular
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_not_posBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_not_pos
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_zeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_zeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimPaymentVirtualSurplusUpperBoundInterim-payment revenue is bounded by interim virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isFeasibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isFeasible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.norm_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_leThe constructed Myerson payment is bounded by twice the absolute report. This uses only the pointwise allocation bounds
0 ≤ x ≤ 1; it is… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_envelope_upperBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_envelope_upper
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.hasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentityBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.hasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentity
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_forall_virtualValue_nonposIf all virtual values are nonpositive, withhold the item.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_iffAllocation probability
1characterizes the positive virtual-value winner. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isFeasibleThe constructed auction is feasible.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_interim_identitiesBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_interim_identities
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eqBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eq
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_of_expectedVirtualSurplus_leVirtual-surplus comparison gives revenue comparison under identity.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_max_winningVirtualValue_zeroThe constructed virtual surplus is the positive part of the winning virtual value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isOnTypeProfileInterior_isOnTypeProfileSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.isOnTypeProfileInterior_isOnTypeProfileSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_winner_eq_one_of_winningVirtualValue_posIf the winning virtual value is positive, the selected winner receives
1. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRulePointwise virtual-surplus maximality.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.survivalIntegral_eq_accumulatedDensityBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.survivalIntegral_eq_accumulatedDensity
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormulaBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormula
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_winnerIndicator_of_posBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_winnerIndicator_of_pos
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasEnvelopeVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_analyticAssumptionsBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasEnvelopeVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_analyticAssumptions
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimPaymentIntegrand_boundFor each fixed report, the constructed Myerson payment integrand is bounded uniformly over opponent profiles.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPaymentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPayment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurableOnce the constructed allocation and payment integrands are measurable, boundedness gives interim integrability for the constructed auction.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_ne_winnerBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_ne_winner
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.expectedPaymentRevenueIntegrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.expectedPaymentRevenueIntegrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualScore_le_of_measurable_virtualValuesBayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualScore_le_of_measurable_virtualValues
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_nonneg_of_hasNonnegativeDensityOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_nonneg_of_hasNonnegativeDensityOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_allocation_survival_integrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_allocation_survival_integrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBoundThe envelope-term upper bound for interim expected payments.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_of_posBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_of_pos
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsOnTypeProfileSupportA type profile lies in the product support.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isOnTypeSupport_leftBayesianSingleItemAuction.isOnTypeSupport_left
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormulaBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormula
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_nonnegBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_nonneg
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_nonpos_iff_forall_virtualValue_nonposThe winning virtual value is nonpositive iff all virtual values are.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedInterimVirtualSurplusEx-ante virtual surplus through interim allocation probabilities.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueUpperBoundedBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueUpperBounded
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptionsFubini hypotheses connecting ex-ante and interim expressions.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_not_posBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_not_pos
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScore_update_neBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScore_update_ne
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identitiesBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identities
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.exists_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_iff_exists_virtualValue_posA sale occurs exactly when some bidder has positive virtual value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone_of_isRegularUnder regularity, the deterministic virtual-surplus-maximizing allocation rule is monotone in the sense required by…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.exists_reserveThreshold_le_bid_of_exists_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_oneIf a sale occurs, some bidder reaches her reserve threshold.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winnerBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsOnTypeProfileInteriorA profile lies in the interior of the product support.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.aestronglyMeasurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimAllocationIntegrandBayesianSingleItemAuction.aestronglyMeasurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimAllocationIntegrand
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_nonnegative_ae_of_hasPositiveDensityOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_nonnegative_ae_of_hasPositiveDensityOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reserveThreshold_le_bid_of_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_oneAn allocated bidder reports at least her reserve threshold.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueComparableBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueComparable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasNonnegativeDensityOnSupportDensities are nonnegative on supports.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBoundExpected revenue is bounded above by expected virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.accumulatedAllocation_density_integrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.accumulatedAllocation_density_integrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIncentiveCompatibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIncentiveCompatible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_revenueUpperBoundedBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_revenueUpperBounded
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_zero_of_isZeroNormalizedA zero-normalized payment rule has zero interim expected payment at type
0. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isSingleItemAllocationRuleThe virtual-surplus-maximizing allocation rule is feasible.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_identityBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_identity
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winner_eq_of_measurable_virtualValuesBayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winner_eq_of_measurable_virtualValues
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_comp_of_measurable_virtualValuesBayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_comp_of_measurable_virtualValues
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_nonpos_of_winningVirtualValue_nonposBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_nonpos_of_winningVirtualValue_nonpos
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_iff_forall_virtualValue_nonposWithholding is equivalent to all virtual values being nonpositive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelope_density_integrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelope_density_integrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_pos_iff_exists_virtualValue_posThe winning virtual value is positive iff some virtual value is positive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_respectsSingleItemCapacityBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_respectsSingleItemCapacity
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reserveThreshold_le_winner_bid_of_winningVirtualValue_posA positive virtual-value winner reaches her reserve threshold.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_winnerIndicator_of_winningVirtualValue_posIf the winning virtual value is positive, allocate to the selected winner.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.intervalIntegrable_interimAllocProb_mul_virtualValue_mul_typeDensity_of_profileSplit_integrableProduct-side virtual-surplus integrability gives interval integrability of the density-weighted interim virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_pointwiseBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_pointwise
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuctionBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueComparable_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueComparable_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.interim_allocation_intervalIntegrableOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.interim_allocation_intervalIntegrableOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.exists_reserveThreshold_le_bid_of_winningVirtualValue_posPositive winning virtual value implies some report reaches reserve.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_iff_winningVirtualValue_nonposWithholding is equivalent to nonpositive winning virtual value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_of_isZeroNormalized_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormulaUnder the interim envelope formula and nonnegative envelope increments, zero normalization implies support-restricted interim IR.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.TypeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptionsType-measure Fubini hypotheses.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_forall_lt_reserveThresholdIf all reports are below reserve thresholds, withhold the item.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_pos_of_hasPositiveDensityOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_pos_of_hasPositiveDensityOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions_of_typeMeasure_fubiniBayesianSingleItemAuction.typeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions_of_typeMeasure_fubini
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptionsAnalytic assumptions for MSZ 12.59.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_paymentRule_for_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_paymentRule_for_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentityExpected revenue equals expected virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.typeDensity_nonnegative_aeBayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.typeDensity_nonnegative_ae
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isImplementable_of_isRegularBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isImplementable_of_isRegular
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.hasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentityBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.hasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentity
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.envelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions_of_environmentBayesianSingleItemAuction.envelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions_of_environment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegral_eq_virtualSurplusIntegralBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegral_eq_virtualSurplusIntegral
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_le_oneBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_le_one
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusEnvironmentAssumptions.typeDensity_nonnegative_aeBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusEnvironmentAssumptions.typeDensity_nonnegative_ae
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasible.isSingleItemAllocationRuleAuction feasibility gives allocation-rule feasibility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironmentMyerson-payment revenue of
B, evaluated in environmentA. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRevenueComparableFeasible candidates with revenue equal to virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_update_self_pos_iff_of_winnerBayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_update_self_pos_iff_of_winner
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.not_forall_lt_reserveThreshold_of_winningVirtualValue_posPositive winning virtual value rules out all reports below reserve.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusEnvironmentAssumptionsEnvironment-level analytic assumptions for the envelope/virtual-surplus comparison.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_of_winner_of_winning_posBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_of_winner_of_winning_pos
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegrand_eq_onSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegrand_eq_onSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_isFeasibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_isFeasible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRuleThe deterministic virtual-surplus-maximizing allocation rule is feasible and pointwise maximizes virtual surplus among all feasible…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule_isVirtualSurplusOptimalThe allocation rule of the Myerson-payment mechanism is virtual-surplus optimal. This exposes the optimal-allocation content at the…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_virtualValue_geThe selected winner has maximal virtual value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleThe allocation rule of the constructed Bayesian auction is ex-ante virtual-surplus optimal under the same explicit integrability…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.jointDensity_pos_of_hasPositiveDensityOnSupport_of_profileInteriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.jointDensity_pos_of_hasPositiveDensityOnSupport_of_profileInterior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasPositiveDensityOnSupport.nonzero_on_supportBayesianSingleItemAuction.HasPositiveDensityOnSupport.nonzero_on_support
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRevenueUpperBoundedFeasible candidates with revenue bounded by virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_eq_myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_eq_myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasSameSellingEnvironmentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasSameSellingEnvironment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimal
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmongExpected seller-revenue optimality among candidates.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasibleICIRIntegrableFeasible IC/IR candidates with integrable virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasPositiveJointDensityAtThe joint density is positive at a profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmongRevenueUpperBoundedRevenue optimality under the one-sided revenue upper bound.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule_isVirtualSurplusOptimalThe allocation rule of the constructed Bayesian single-item auction is virtual-surplus optimal.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.exists_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_iff_winningVirtualValue_posA sale occurs exactly when the selected virtual value is positive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_measurableBayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_measurable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_envelope_analyticBayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_envelope_analytic
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsZeroNormalizedZero normalization for a Bayesian single-item auction's payment rule: reporting
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in@[simp] theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : (A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction).allocationRule = A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule := by rfl