AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

CoalitionalGame.Core

defimported Lean

The core of a coalitional game: payoff vectors where no coalition can improve upon its allocation. [MSZ 17.2] An element x of the core satisfies: - Efficiency: ∑ᵢ xᵢ = v(N) - Coalition stability: ∑_{i ∈ S} xᵢ ≥ v(S) for all S

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Fintype N] in
variable (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ) in
def CoalitionalGame.Core : Set (PayoffVector N ℝ)
Defined in
EconCSLib, `CoalitionalGame.Core`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 4
  • CoalitionalGame.IsEfficientA payoff vector is efficient if it distributes exactly v(N). [MSZ 16.1] Requires [Fintype N] and [AddCommMonoid U].
  • CoalitionalGame.PayoffVectorA payoff vector: an assignment of payoffs to players.
  • CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility. N is the player type; U is the utility type. v assigns a worth to each coalition, with…
  • CoalitionalGame.coalitionPayoffThe total payoff of a coalition under a payoff vector. Requires [AddCommMonoid U] for the finite sum.
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Fintype N] in
variable (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ) in
/-- The core of a coalitional game: payoff vectors where no coalition can improve upon its allocation. [MSZ 17.2] An element `x` of the core satisfies: - Efficiency: `∑ᵢ xᵢ = v(N)` - Coalition stability: `∑_{i ∈ S} xᵢ ≥ v(S)` for all `S` -/
def CoalitionalGame.Core : Set (PayoffVector N ℝ) :=
  { x | G.IsEfficient x ∧ ∀ S : Finset N, coalitionPayoff x S ≥ G.v S }
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