CoalitionalGame.Core
defimported Lean
The core of a coalitional game: payoff vectors where no coalition can improve upon its allocation. [MSZ 17.2] An element x of the core satisfies: - Efficiency: ∑ᵢ xᵢ = v(N) - Coalition stability: ∑_{i ∈ S} xᵢ ≥ v(S) for all S
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Fintype N] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ) in def CoalitionalGame.Core : Set (PayoffVector N ℝ)
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `CoalitionalGame.Core`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.CoalitionalGame.Core← CoalitionalGame.Core (EconCSLib/GameTheory/CoalitionalGame/Core.lean:46): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 4
- CoalitionalGame.IsEfficientA payoff vector is efficient if it distributes exactly
v(N). [MSZ 16.1] Requires[Fintype N]and[AddCommMonoid U]. - CoalitionalGame.PayoffVectorA payoff vector: an assignment of payoffs to players.
- CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
Nis the player type;Uis the utility type.vassigns a worth to each coalition, with… - CoalitionalGame.coalitionPayoffThe total payoff of a coalition under a payoff vector. Requires
[AddCommMonoid U]for the finite sum.
- CoalitionalGame.IsEfficientA payoff vector is efficient if it distributes exactly
- Used by 1
- CoalitionalGame.core_subset_imputationsEvery element of the core is an imputation.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Fintype N] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ) in /-- The core of a coalitional game: payoff vectors where no coalition can improve upon its allocation. [MSZ 17.2] An element `x` of the core satisfies: - Efficiency: `∑ᵢ xᵢ = v(N)` - Coalition stability: `∑_{i ∈ S} xᵢ ≥ v(S)` for all `S` -/ def CoalitionalGame.Core : Set (PayoffVector N ℝ) := { x | G.IsEfficient x ∧ ∀ S : Finset N, coalitionPayoff x S ≥ G.v S }