CoalitionalGame.core_subset_imputations
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Every element of the core is an imputation.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Fintype N] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ) in theorem CoalitionalGame.core_subset_imputations : G.Core ⊆ { x | G.IsImputation x }
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `CoalitionalGame.core_subset_imputations`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.CoalitionalGame.core_subset_imputations← CoalitionalGame.core_subset_imputations (EconCSLib/GameTheory/CoalitionalGame/Core.lean:50): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 7
- CoalitionalGame.IsEfficientA payoff vector is efficient if it distributes exactly
v(N). [MSZ 16.1] Requires[Fintype N]and[AddCommMonoid U]. - CoalitionalGame.PayoffVectorA payoff vector: an assignment of payoffs to players.
- CoalitionalGame.IsImputationAn imputation is an efficient and individually rational payoff vector. [MSZ 17.1]
- CoalitionalGame.IsIndividuallyRationalA payoff vector is individually rational if each player gets at least their singleton worth. Requires
[LE U]. - CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
Nis the player type;Uis the utility type.vassigns a worth to each coalition, with… - CoalitionalGame.CoreThe core of a coalitional game: payoff vectors where no coalition can improve upon its allocation. [MSZ 17.2] An element
xof the core… - CoalitionalGame.coalitionPayoffThe total payoff of a coalition under a payoff vector. Requires
[AddCommMonoid U]for the finite sum.
- CoalitionalGame.IsEfficientA payoff vector is efficient if it distributes exactly
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset BigOperators invariable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Fintype N] invariable (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ) in/-- Every element of the core is an imputation. -/theorem CoalitionalGame.core_subset_imputations : G.Core ⊆ { x | G.IsImputation x } := by intro x ⟨heff, hcoal⟩ refine ⟨heff, fun i => ?_⟩ have h := hcoal {i} simp [coalitionPayoff] at h exact h