CoalitionalGame.PayoffVector
abbrevimported Lean
A payoff vector: an assignment of payoffs to players.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] {U : Type*} [AddZeroClass U] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N U) in abbrev CoalitionalGame.PayoffVector (N : Type*) (U : Type*)
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `CoalitionalGame.PayoffVector`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.CoalitionalGame.PayoffVector← CoalitionalGame.PayoffVector (EconCSLib/GameTheory/CoalitionalGame/Basic.lean:64): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
Nis the player type;Uis the utility type.vassigns a worth to each coalition, with…
- CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
- Used by 6
- CoalitionalGame.IsEfficientA payoff vector is efficient if it distributes exactly
v(N). [MSZ 16.1] Requires[Fintype N]and[AddCommMonoid U]. - CoalitionalGame.IsImputationAn imputation is an efficient and individually rational payoff vector. [MSZ 17.1]
- CoalitionalGame.IsIndividuallyRationalA payoff vector is individually rational if each player gets at least their singleton worth. Requires
[LE U]. - CoalitionalGame.core_subset_imputationsEvery element of the core is an imputation.
- CoalitionalGame.CoreThe core of a coalitional game: payoff vectors where no coalition can improve upon its allocation. [MSZ 17.2] An element
xof the core… - CoalitionalGame.coalitionPayoffThe total payoff of a coalition under a payoff vector. Requires
[AddCommMonoid U]for the finite sum.
- CoalitionalGame.IsEfficientA payoff vector is efficient if it distributes exactly
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] {U : Type*} [AddZeroClass U] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N U) in /-- A payoff vector: an assignment of payoffs to players. -/ abbrev CoalitionalGame.PayoffVector (N : Type*) (U : Type*) := N → U