CoalitionalGame.IsImputation
defimported Lean
An imputation is an efficient and individually rational payoff vector. [MSZ 17.1]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] {U : Type*} [AddZeroClass U] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N U) in def CoalitionalGame.IsImputation [Fintype N] [AddCommMonoid U] [LE U] (x : PayoffVector N U) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `CoalitionalGame.IsImputation`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.CoalitionalGame.IsImputation← CoalitionalGame.IsImputation (EconCSLib/GameTheory/CoalitionalGame/Basic.lean:84): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 4
- CoalitionalGame.IsEfficientA payoff vector is efficient if it distributes exactly
v(N). [MSZ 16.1] Requires[Fintype N]and[AddCommMonoid U]. - CoalitionalGame.PayoffVectorA payoff vector: an assignment of payoffs to players.
- CoalitionalGame.IsIndividuallyRationalA payoff vector is individually rational if each player gets at least their singleton worth. Requires
[LE U]. - CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
Nis the player type;Uis the utility type.vassigns a worth to each coalition, with…
- CoalitionalGame.IsEfficientA payoff vector is efficient if it distributes exactly
- Used by 1
- CoalitionalGame.core_subset_imputationsEvery element of the core is an imputation.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] {U : Type*} [AddZeroClass U] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N U) in /-- An imputation is an efficient and individually rational payoff vector. [MSZ 17.1] -/ def CoalitionalGame.IsImputation [Fintype N] [AddCommMonoid U] [LE U] (x : PayoffVector N U) : Prop := G.IsEfficient x ∧ G.IsIndividuallyRational x