AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

op_1641_counterexample_three_players_exists

theoremverifiedoriginal

There exists a superadditive 2/3-convex coalitional game on 3 players whose Shapley value does not belong to its core.

Statement

theorem op_1641_counterexample_three_players_exists :
    ∃ (G : CoalitionalGame (Fin 3) ℝ), G.IsSuperadditive ∧ G.IsTwoThirdsConvex ∧ G.shapleyValue ∉ G.Core
Related work
arXiv:2611.16207, Core nonemptiness for 2/3-convex games, Section 5
Verified
16 Nov 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 7
  • CoalitionalGame.IsTwoThirdsConvexA transferable-utility game G with real characteristic function v on a finite set of players N is 2/3-convex if for every triple of…
  • CoalitionalGame.IsSuperadditiveA game is superadditive if the worth of the union of disjoint coalitions is at least the sum of their worths. [MSZ 16.8] Requires [LE U]…
  • CoalitionalGame.shapleyValueThe Shapley value of player i. [MSZ 18.14, 18.17] φᵢ(v) = ∑_{S ⊆ N{i}} |S|!(|N|-|S|-1)!/|N|! · (v(S∪{i}) - v(S))
  • CoalitionalGame.CoreThe core of a coalitional game: payoff vectors where no coalition can improve upon its allocation. [MSZ 17.2] An element x of the core…
  • CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility. N is the player type; U is the utility type. v assigns a worth to each coalition, with…
  • op_1641_two_thirds_convex_shapley_in_core_negationIt is not the case that for every finite player set N with at least 3 players, the Shapley value of every superadditive 2/3-convex…
  • CoalitionalGame.PayoffVectorA payoff vector: an assignment of payoffs to players.

Read back from the Lean

There exists a coalitional game $G$ on the player type Fin 3 (a 3-player game) with payoffs in $\mathbb{R}$ such that $G$ is superadditive (G.IsSuperadditive), $G$ is 2/3-convex (G.IsTwoThirdsConvex), and the Shapley value of $G$ (G.shapleyValue) is not in the core of $G$ (G.Core).

Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.

The proof, explained

The existence claim is established constructively by exhibiting an explicit 3-player coalitional game, op_1641_G. The proof supplies this game along with three previously proven lemmas verifying that it is superadditive, 2/3-convex, and that its Shapley value does not belong to its core.

  1. The game op_1641_G is a superadditive, 2/3-convex 3-player game whose Shapley value lies outside its core.

    The existential goal is witnessed by the explicit game op_1641_G, together with three previously established properties: op_1641_G_superadd proves it is superadditive, op_1641_G_two_thirds_convex proves it is 2/3-convex, and op_1641_G_not_in_core proves that its Shapley value is not in its core.

    line 4

    uses op_1641_G, op_1641_G_superadd, op_1641_G_two_thirds_convex, op_1641_G_not_in_core

      exact ⟨op_1641_G, op_1641_G_superadd, op_1641_G_two_thirds_convex, op_1641_G_not_in_core⟩
op_1641_G
A specific 3-player coalitional game with real-valued coalition payoffs.
op_1641_G_superadd
The game op_1641_G is superadditive.
op_1641_G_two_thirds_convex
The game op_1641_G is 2/3-convex.
op_1641_G_not_in_core
The Shapley value of op_1641_G does not belong to its core.

Written by a model (gemini-3.8-flash) from the Lean proof and the goal states Lean reported at each step. Lean verified the proof; this explanation is a reading aid and is not itself machine-checked.

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- Existence of a 3-player superadditive 2/3-convex game whose Shapley value is outside the core. -/theorem op_1641_counterexample_three_players_exists :    ∃ (G : CoalitionalGame (Fin 3) ℝ), G.IsSuperadditive ∧ G.IsTwoThirdsConvex ∧ G.shapleyValue ∉ G.Core := by  exact ⟨op_1641_G, op_1641_G_superadd, op_1641_G_two_thirds_convex, op_1641_G_not_in_core⟩
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