EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsMixedNashEq
defimported Lean
A mixed profile is a mixed Nash equilibrium if no player can improve their expected payoff by deviating to any pure strategy. By linearity of expected payoff in each player's mixed strategy, checking pure deviations suffices. [MSZ 5.5, 5.18] Requires [Fintype N] for expected payoff computation.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsMixedNashEq (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] (p : MixedProfile G) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.IsMixedNashEq`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsMixedNashEq← StrategicGame.IsMixedNashEq (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/MixedStrategy.lean:186): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsMixedNashEq--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/MixedStrategy.lean:186 (StrategicGame.IsMixedNashEq) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,10 +1,7 @@ -/-- A mixed profile is a mixed Nash equilibrium if no player can improve their - expected payoff by deviating to any pure strategy. - - By linearity of expected payoff in each player's mixed strategy, checking - pure deviations suffices. [MSZ 5.5, 5.18] - - Requires `[Fintype N]` for expected payoff computation. -/ -def IsMixedNashEq - (G : StrategicGame N U) +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open Finset BigOperators in +variable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in +def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsMixedNashEq + (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 4
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixedDeviate player
whoto pure strategys', keeping others' mixed strategies. - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.expectedPayoffExpected payoff for player
whounder mixed profilep.EU(p, who) = ∑_{σ : Profile} (∏_i p_i(σ_i)) · payoff(σ, who)Requires… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedProfileA mixed profile: each player has a mixed strategy. No finiteness constraint on
N(player set can be arbitrary).
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixedDeviate player
- Used by 1
- MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibriumThe strategic-game embedding of a finite matrix game admits a mixed Nash equilibrium. Combines…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in /-- A mixed profile is a mixed Nash equilibrium if no player can improve their expected payoff by deviating to any pure strategy. By linearity of expected payoff in each player's mixed strategy, checking pure deviations suffices. [MSZ 5.5, 5.18] Requires `[Fintype N]` for expected payoff computation. -/ def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsMixedNashEq (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] (p : MixedProfile G) : Prop := ∀ (who : N) (s' : G.strategy who), expectedPayoff G (deviateMixed G p who s') who ≤ expectedPayoff G p who