EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed
defimported Lean
Deviate player who to pure strategy s', keeping others' mixed strategies.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] [DecidableEq N] [∀ i, DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] (p : MixedProfile G) (who : N) (s' : G.strategy who) : MixedProfile G
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.deviateMixed`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed← StrategicGame.deviateMixed (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/MixedStrategy.lean:171): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/MixedStrategy.lean:171 (StrategicGame.deviateMixed) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,4 +1,7 @@ -/-- Deviate player `who` to pure strategy `s'`, keeping others' mixed strategies. -/ -def deviateMixed - (G : StrategicGame N U) +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open Finset BigOperators in +variable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in +def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed + (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] [DecidableEq N] [∀ i, DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 4
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategyA mixed strategy for player
i: a probability distribution over pure strategies. Requires[Fintype (G.strategy i)]but NOT[Fintype N]. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixedEmbed a pure strategy as a mixed strategy (point mass).
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedProfileA mixed profile: each player has a mixed strategy. No finiteness constraint on
N(player set can be arbitrary).
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategyA mixed strategy for player
- Used by 2
- MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibriumThe strategic-game embedding of a finite matrix game admits a mixed Nash equilibrium. Combines…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsMixedNashEqA mixed profile is a mixed Nash equilibrium if no player can improve their expected payoff by deviating to any pure strategy. By linearity…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in /-- Deviate player `who` to pure strategy `s'`, keeping others' mixed strategies. -/ def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] [DecidableEq N] [∀ i, DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] (p : MixedProfile G) (who : N) (s' : G.strategy who) : MixedProfile G := Function.update p who (pureToMixed s')