EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedProfile
defimported Lean
A mixed profile: each player has a mixed strategy. No finiteness constraint on N (player set can be arbitrary).
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedProfile (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)]
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.MixedProfile`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedProfile← StrategicGame.MixedProfile (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/MixedStrategy.lean:58): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedProfile--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/MixedStrategy.lean:58 (StrategicGame.MixedProfile) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ -/-- A mixed profile: each player has a mixed strategy. - No finiteness constraint on `N` (player set can be arbitrary). -/ -def MixedProfile (G : StrategicGame N U) [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] := +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open Finset BigOperators in +variable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in +def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedProfile (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] := ∀ i, MixedStrategy G i - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategyA mixed strategy for player
i: a probability distribution over pure strategies. Requires[Fintype (G.strategy i)]but NOT[Fintype N]. - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategyA mixed strategy for player
- Used by 14
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsCompletelyMixedProfile.playerA completely mixed profile gives a completely mixed strategy for each player.
- MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zeroBridge lemma:
expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 0 = A.E (p 0) (p 1). Reduces both sides to the canonical double sum… - MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibriumThe strategic-game embedding of a finite matrix game admits a mixed Nash equilibrium. Combines…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixedDeviate player
whoto pure strategys', keeping others' mixed strategies. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.uniformMixedProfileThe profile where every player uses the uniform mixed strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.expectedPayoff_negIn a zero-sum game, player 1's expected payoff is the negation of player 0's.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsCompletelyMixedProfileA mixed profile is completely mixed if every player's mixed strategy is completely mixed.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.expectedPayoff_add_zeroMixed-strategy version of the zero-sum axiom: expected payoffs sum to
0. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.expectedPayoff_neg'In a zero-sum game, player 0's expected payoff is the negation of player 1's.
- MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_oneMirror:
expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 1 = -(A.E (p 0) (p 1)). - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsMixedNashEqA mixed profile is a mixed Nash equilibrium if no player can improve their expected payoff by deviating to any pure strategy. By linearity…
- MatrixGame.toMixedProfileBuild a
MixedProfileoftoStrategicGamefrom a saddle-point pair. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.expectedPayoffExpected payoff for player
whounder mixed profilep.EU(p, who) = ∑_{σ : Profile} (∏_i p_i(σ_i)) · payoff(σ, who)Requires… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureProfileToMixedEmbed a pure profile as a mixed profile.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in /-- A mixed profile: each player has a mixed strategy. No finiteness constraint on `N` (player set can be arbitrary). -/ def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedProfile (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] := ∀ i, MixedStrategy G i