KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer_ge
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer_ge
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open KnapsackAuction in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I : Type*} {U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in variable [Fintype I] [DecidableEq I] in lemma KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer_ge (A : KnapsackAuction I U) (b : I → U) (hW : 0 ≤ A.totalCapacity) {x : BinaryAllocation I} (hx : x ∈ A.feasibleBinaryAllocations) : binarySocialWelfare b x ≤ binarySocialWelfare b (A.welfareMaximizer b hW)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer_ge`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer_ge← KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer_ge (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Knapsack.lean:202): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 8
- KnapsackAuction.feasibleBinaryAllocationsThe finite list of binary allocations satisfying the knapsack constraint.
- KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizerKnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer
- KnapsackAuction.exists_welfareMaximizerA welfare-maximizing feasible binary allocation, chosen using
List.argMaxOnon the finite space of feasible0/1allocations. - KnapsackAuctionA knapsack auction with public weights
w iand total capacityW. The underlying strategic object is aSingleParameterMechanism I U,… - TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
≤is total (complete). This is weaker thanLinearOrder— it does NOT require antisymmetry or… - LinearOrder.toTotalPreorderEvery
LinearOrderis aTotalPreorder. - KnapsackAuction.BinaryAllocationA discrete knapsack allocation profile: each agent is either selected or not.
- KnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfareSocial welfare of a binary allocation profile at valuation profile
b.
- Used by 1
- KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotoneKnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen KnapsackAuction inopen scoped BigOperators invariable {I : Type*} {U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] invariable [Fintype I] [DecidableEq I] inlemma KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer_ge (A : KnapsackAuction I U) (b : I → U) (hW : 0 ≤ A.totalCapacity) {x : BinaryAllocation I} (hx : x ∈ A.feasibleBinaryAllocations) : binarySocialWelfare b x ≤ binarySocialWelfare b (A.welfareMaximizer b hW) := by exact (Classical.choose_spec (A.exists_welfareMaximizer b hW)).2 x hx