KnapsackAuction.exists_welfareMaximizer
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
A welfare-maximizing feasible binary allocation, chosen using List.argMaxOn on the finite space of feasible 0/1 allocations.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open KnapsackAuction in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I : Type*} {U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in variable [Fintype I] [DecidableEq I] in lemma KnapsackAuction.exists_welfareMaximizer (A : KnapsackAuction I U) (b : I → U) (hW : 0 ≤ A.totalCapacity) : ∃ x : BinaryAllocation I, x ∈ A.feasibleBinaryAllocations ∧ ∀ y ∈ A.feasibleBinaryAllocations, binarySocialWelfare b y ≤ binarySocialWelfare b x
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `KnapsackAuction.exists_welfareMaximizer`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.KnapsackAuction.exists_welfareMaximizer← KnapsackAuction.exists_welfareMaximizer (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Knapsack.lean:169): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 9
- KnapsackAuction.feasibleBinaryAllocationsThe finite list of binary allocations satisfying the knapsack constraint.
- KnapsackAuction.feasibleBinaryAllocations_nonemptyKnapsackAuction.feasibleBinaryAllocations_nonempty
- KnapsackAuctionA knapsack auction with public weights
w iand total capacityW. The underlying strategic object is aSingleParameterMechanism I U,… - TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
≤is total (complete). This is weaker thanLinearOrder— it does NOT require antisymmetry or… - LinearOrder.toTotalPreorderEvery
LinearOrderis aTotalPreorder. - KnapsackAuction.BinaryAllocationA discrete knapsack allocation profile: each agent is either selected or not.
- KnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfareSocial welfare of a binary allocation profile at valuation profile
b. - List.exists_argMax_onExistence of an argmax on a non-empty list under a total preorder. Since the preorder may lack antisymmetry, ties are allowed — we…
- List.argMaxOnA chosen maximizer of
fon the non-empty listhead :: tail, computed by a left fold that keeps the running maximizer (ties keep…
- Used by 3
- KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizerKnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer
- KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer_geKnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer_ge
- KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer_mem_feasibleBinaryAllocationsKnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer_mem_feasibleBinaryAllocations
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen KnapsackAuction inopen scoped BigOperators invariable {I : Type*} {U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] invariable [Fintype I] [DecidableEq I] in/-- A welfare-maximizing feasible binary allocation, chosen using `List.argMaxOn` on the finite space of feasible `0/1` allocations. -/lemma KnapsackAuction.exists_welfareMaximizer (A : KnapsackAuction I U) (b : I → U) (hW : 0 ≤ A.totalCapacity) : ∃ x : BinaryAllocation I, x ∈ A.feasibleBinaryAllocations ∧ ∀ y ∈ A.feasibleBinaryAllocations, binarySocialWelfare b y ≤ binarySocialWelfare b x := by classical let xs := A.feasibleBinaryAllocations have hxs : xs ≠ [] := A.feasibleBinaryAllocations_nonempty hW cases h : xs with | nil => exact False.elim (hxs h) | cons head tail => obtain ⟨x, hxmem, hxmax⟩ := List.exists_argMax_on (binarySocialWelfare b) head tail refine ⟨x, ?_, ?_⟩ · simpa [xs, h] using hxmem · intro y hy exact hxmax y (by simpa [xs, h] using hy)