AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

KnapsackAuction

structureimported Lean

A knapsack auction with public weights w i and total capacity W. The underlying strategic object is a SingleParameterMechanism I U, where the value type U is a linearly ordered field ([Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U]; e.g. ℚ, ℝ): each agent reports a single scalar value in U, receives an allocation level xᵢ ∈ U, and makes a U-valued payment. The pointwise allocation bounds are inherited from SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasible; the knapsack constraint is recorded separately below.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open scoped BigOperators in
structure KnapsackAuction (I : Type*) (U : Type*)
    extends SingleParameterMechanism I U
Defined in
EconCSLib, `KnapsackAuction`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 3
  • SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent i has a single private type θ_i : R (their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent…
  • MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. - I — agents - T — report/type space of each agent - A — allocation space - P — payment space…
  • SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasibleAllocation feasibility: each agent's allocation lies in [0, 1]. Requires Zero R, One R, and LE R (e.g., any linearly ordered field).
Used by 45

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open scoped BigOperators in
/-- A knapsack auction with public weights `w i` and total capacity `W`. The underlying strategic object is a `SingleParameterMechanism I U`, where the value type `U` is a linearly ordered field (`[Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U]`; e.g. `ℚ`, `ℝ`): each agent reports a single scalar value in `U`, receives an allocation level `xᵢ ∈ U`, and makes a `U`-valued payment. The pointwise allocation bounds are inherited from `SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasible`; the knapsack constraint is recorded separately below. -/
structure KnapsackAuction (I : Type*) (U : Type*)
    extends SingleParameterMechanism I U where
  /-- Public weight / size of agent `i` in the knapsack constraint. -/
  weight : I → U
  /-- Total knapsack capacity. -/
  totalCapacity : U
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