MatrixGame.IsValue
defimported Lean
v is the value of A (saddle-point form): there exist a row mixed strategy x and column mixed strategy y such that x guarantees at least v against every column and y caps player I's payoff at v against every row. Field-generic; MatrixGame.value below is the ℝ-valued specialisation (via iSup) when 𝕜 admits order completeness.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators Matrix in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) in def MatrixGame.IsValue (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (v : 𝕜) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.IsValue`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.IsValue← MatrixGame.IsValue (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGame.lean:143): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 4
- MatrixGame.EiExpected payoff when pure row
ifaces Player II's mixed strategyy. - MatrixGame.valueThe value of a matrix game (
sSup-based; needs order completeness). Equal to both maximin and minimax by the minimax theorem… - MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j… - MatrixGame.EjExpected payoff when Player I uses
xagainst pure columnj.
- MatrixGame.EiExpected payoff when pure row
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators Matrix in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) in /-- `v` is **the value** of `A` (saddle-point form): there exist a row mixed strategy `x` and column mixed strategy `y` such that `x` guarantees at least `v` against every column and `y` caps player I's payoff at `v` against every row. Field-generic; `MatrixGame.value` below is the ℝ-valued specialisation (via `iSup`) when `𝕜` admits order completeness. -/ def MatrixGame.IsValue (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (v : 𝕜) : Prop := ∃ x : stdSimplex 𝕜 I, ∃ y : stdSimplex 𝕜 J, (∀ j, v ≤ A.Ej x j) ∧ (∀ i, A.Ei i y ≤ v)