AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

MatrixGame.IsValue

defimported Lean

v is the value of A (saddle-point form): there exist a row mixed strategy x and column mixed strategy y such that x guarantees at least v against every column and y caps player I's payoff at v against every row. Field-generic; MatrixGame.value below is the ℝ-valued specialisation (via iSup) when 𝕜 admits order completeness.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators Matrix in
variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
variable {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] in
variable (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) in
def MatrixGame.IsValue (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (v : 𝕜) : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.IsValue`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 4
  • MatrixGame.EiExpected payoff when pure row i faces Player II's mixed strategy y.
  • MatrixGame.valueThe value of a matrix game (sSup-based; needs order completeness). Equal to both maximin and minimax by the minimax theorem…
  • MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row i : I, Player II chooses column j : J. Payoff to Player I is g i j…
  • MatrixGame.EjExpected payoff when Player I uses x against pure column j.

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators Matrix in
variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
variable {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] in
variable (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) in
/-- `v` is **the value** of `A` (saddle-point form): there exist a row mixed strategy `x` and column mixed strategy `y` such that `x` guarantees at least `v` against every column and `y` caps player I's payoff at `v` against every row. Field-generic; `MatrixGame.value` below is the ℝ-valued specialisation (via `iSup`) when `𝕜` admits order completeness. -/
def MatrixGame.IsValue (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (v : 𝕜) : Prop :=
  ∃ x : stdSimplex 𝕜 I, ∃ y : stdSimplex 𝕜 J,
    (∀ j, v ≤ A.Ej x j) ∧ (∀ i, A.Ei i y ≤ v)
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