MatrixGame.Ei
defimported Lean
Expected payoff when pure row i faces Player II's mixed strategy y.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators Matrix in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable {π : Type} [Field π] [LinearOrder π] [IsStrictOrderedRing π] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J π) in noncomputable def MatrixGame.Ei (i : I) (y : stdSimplex π J) : π
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.Ei`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.Ei← MatrixGame.Ei (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGame.lean:97): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j⦠- MatrixGame.payoffAgainstRowExpected payoff when pure row
ifaces Player II's mixed strategyy.
- MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
- Used by 16
- MatrixGame.optimal_pairs_iff_saddle_pointOptimal pairs β saddle points. A pair of mixed strategies is in the product
X(A) à Y(A)of optimal strategy sets iff it is a saddle⦠- MatrixGame.IsMinimax
vis a minimax value ofA: some column strategy caps player I's payoff atv(existence), and no strictly smaller cap is⦠- MatrixGame.IsPlayerIIGuarantee
wis a guarantee for player II when some mixed column strategy caps expected payoff†wagainst every pure row. Equivalent to⦠- MatrixGame.guarantee_IIPlayer II's guaranteed loss using mixed strategy
y: the maximum expected payoff (for Player I) over all of Player I's pure responses. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MatrixGame.disp_Ei_uniformUnder the uniform distribution, the column-side payoff under
disp Ais zero (whenAis stochastic). - MatrixGame.IsValue
vis the value ofA(saddle-point form): there exist a row mixed strategyxand column mixed strategyysuch thatx⦠- MatrixGame.common_guarantee_eq_valueCommon guarantee gives the value. If both players guarantee the same scalar
w, thenwequals the game value. - MatrixGame.IsFictitiousPlayFictitious play realisation on a matrix game
A. At every stepn + 1, the row player picks a pure row best-responding to the column⦠- MatrixGame.optimalRowSet_nonemptyMatrixGame.optimalRowSet_nonempty
- MatrixGame.mem_optimalColumnStrategies_iff_E_leA column strategy is optimal iff against every mixed row it caps payoff at the value.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MatrixGame.disp_Ei_argmin_nonnegFor any column-player strategy
y, picking the index whereyis minimal gives a non-negative row payoff underdisp A. - MatrixGame.minimax_optimal_strategiesExistence of optimal mixed strategies: there exist mixed strategies
xxfor Player I andyyfor Player II and a valuevsuch that: -β¦ - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MatrixGame.disp_EiRow-side payoff under
disp A:Ei i y = (Ay)_i β y_i. - MatrixGame.support_complementarity_rowSupport complementarity (row). For an optimal pair
(xx, yy), every rowiwith positive probability underxxis a best response⦠- MatrixGame.optimalColumnSet_nonemptyMatrixGame.optimalColumnSet_nonempty
- saddle_gap_guarantee_II_eq_sup_sub_infFor a positive natural number n with
[NeZero n], an n-by-n real matrix A : Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) β, and a strategy vector x :β¦
- MatrixGame.optimal_pairs_iff_saddle_pointOptimal pairs β saddle points. A pair of mixed strategies is in the product
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators Matrix in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable {π : Type} [Field π] [LinearOrder π] [IsStrictOrderedRing π] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J π) in /-- Expected payoff when pure row `i` faces Player II's mixed strategy `y`. -/ noncomputable def MatrixGame.Ei (i : I) (y : stdSimplex π J) : π := A.payoffAgainstRow i y