MatrixGame.exists_mixed_nash_equilibrium
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Matrix games have a mixed Nash equilibrium — over any linearly ordered field. Packages the field-generic saddle Minimax.minimax (proved by von Neumann symmetrisation; no compactness, no order-completeness) into the IsMixedNashEq saddle-point form. The ℝ case is the 𝕜 := ℝ instance, so all ℝ consumers are unaffected.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in universe u in variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in theorem MatrixGame.exists_mixed_nash_equilibrium {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) : ∃ (xx : stdSimplex 𝕜 I) (yy : stdSimplex 𝕜 J), A.IsMixedNashEq xx yy
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.exists_mixed_nash_equilibrium`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.exists_mixed_nash_equilibrium← MatrixGame.exists_mixed_nash_equilibrium (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGameNash.lean:458): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 6
- Minimax.minimaxOrdered-field von Neumann minimax. Every finite two-player zero-sum game over a linearly ordered field has a value and optimal mixed…
- wsumWeighted sum of
fwith weights from a simplex elementx. Thinabbrevover Mathlib's finite dot product⬝ᵥ: definitionally equal,… - MatrixGame.isMixedNashEq_of_purePure-strategy guarantees give a mixed Nash equilibrium. If
xxguarantees valuevagainst every pure column andyycaps the row… - MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j… - wsum_pure_applyWeighted sum at a point mass evaluates the chosen coordinate.
- MatrixGame.IsMixedNashEqSaddle-point form of a mixed Nash equilibrium for a matrix game. For zero-sum two-player games, the standard mixed-strategy Nash…
- Used by 1
- MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibriumThe strategic-game embedding of a finite matrix game admits a mixed Nash equilibrium. Combines…
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset BigOperators inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false inuniverse u invariable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] invariable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in/-- **Matrix games have a mixed Nash equilibrium — over any linearly ordered field.** Packages the field-generic saddle `Minimax.minimax` (proved by von Neumann symmetrisation; no compactness, no order-completeness) into the `IsMixedNashEq` saddle-point form. The ℝ case is the `𝕜 := ℝ` instance, so all ℝ consumers are unaffected. -/theorem MatrixGame.exists_mixed_nash_equilibrium {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) : ∃ (xx : stdSimplex 𝕜 I) (yy : stdSimplex 𝕜 J), A.IsMixedNashEq xx yy := by classical obtain ⟨x, y, v, hx_nn, hx_sum, hy_nn, hy_sum, hxA, hAy⟩ := Minimax.minimax A.g refine ⟨⟨x, hx_nn, hx_sum⟩, ⟨y, hy_nn, hy_sum⟩, ?_⟩ apply isMixedNashEq_of_pure A (v := v) · intro j; exact hxA j · intro i show (∑ j, y j * A.g i j) ≤ v calc (∑ j, y j * A.g i j) = ∑ j, A.g i j * y j := Finset.sum_congr rfl (fun j _ => mul_comm _ _) _ ≤ v := hAy i