AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

MatrixGame.exists_mixed_nash_equilibrium

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Matrix games have a mixed Nash equilibrium — over any linearly ordered field. Packages the field-generic saddle Minimax.minimax (proved by von Neumann symmetrisation; no compactness, no order-completeness) into the IsMixedNashEq saddle-point form. The ℝ case is the 𝕜 := ℝ instance, so all ℝ consumers are unaffected.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
universe u in
variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in
theorem MatrixGame.exists_mixed_nash_equilibrium {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜]
    [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) :
    ∃ (xx : stdSimplex 𝕜 I) (yy : stdSimplex 𝕜 J), A.IsMixedNashEq xx yy
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.exists_mixed_nash_equilibrium`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 6
  • Minimax.minimaxOrdered-field von Neumann minimax. Every finite two-player zero-sum game over a linearly ordered field has a value and optimal mixed…
  • wsumWeighted sum of f with weights from a simplex element x. Thin abbrev over Mathlib's finite dot product ⬝ᵥ: definitionally equal,…
  • MatrixGame.isMixedNashEq_of_purePure-strategy guarantees give a mixed Nash equilibrium. If xx guarantees value v against every pure column and yy caps the row…
  • MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row i : I, Player II chooses column j : J. Payoff to Player I is g i j…
  • wsum_pure_applyWeighted sum at a point mass evaluates the chosen coordinate.
  • MatrixGame.IsMixedNashEqSaddle-point form of a mixed Nash equilibrium for a matrix game. For zero-sum two-player games, the standard mixed-strategy Nash…
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset BigOperators inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false inuniverse u invariable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] invariable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in/-- **Matrix games have a mixed Nash equilibrium — over any linearly ordered field.** Packages the field-generic saddle `Minimax.minimax` (proved by von Neumann symmetrisation; no compactness, no order-completeness) into the `IsMixedNashEq` saddle-point form. The ℝ case is the `𝕜 := ℝ` instance, so all ℝ consumers are unaffected. -/theorem MatrixGame.exists_mixed_nash_equilibrium {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜]    [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) :    ∃ (xx : stdSimplex 𝕜 I) (yy : stdSimplex 𝕜 J), A.IsMixedNashEq xx yy := by  classical  obtain ⟨x, y, v, hx_nn, hx_sum, hy_nn, hy_sum, hxA, hAy⟩ := Minimax.minimax A.g  refine ⟨⟨x, hx_nn, hx_sum⟩, ⟨y, hy_nn, hy_sum⟩, ?_⟩  apply isMixedNashEq_of_pure A (v := v)  · intro j; exact hxA j  · intro i    show (∑ j, y j * A.g i j) ≤ v    calc (∑ j, y j * A.g i j) = ∑ j, A.g i j * y j :=          Finset.sum_congr rfl (fun j _ => mul_comm _ _)      _ ≤ v := hAy i
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