MatrixGame.IsMixedNashEq
defimported Lean
Saddle-point form of a mixed Nash equilibrium for a matrix game. For zero-sum two-player games, the standard mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is exactly the saddle point of the bilinear payoff: the row player cannot improve by deviating to any mixed row, and the column player cannot improve (i.e., decrease the row player's payoff) by deviating to any mixed column. Field-generic: the saddle-point inequalities only need a linearly ordered field, not order-completeness.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in universe u in variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in def MatrixGame.IsMixedNashEq {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (xx : stdSimplex 𝕜 I) (yy : stdSimplex 𝕜 J) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.IsMixedNashEq`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.IsMixedNashEq← MatrixGame.IsMixedNashEq (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGameNash.lean:64): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- MatrixGame.EExpected payoff when Player I uses mixed strategy
xand Player II usesy. - MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j…
- MatrixGame.EExpected payoff when Player I uses mixed strategy
- Used by 5
- MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibriumThe strategic-game embedding of a finite matrix game admits a mixed Nash equilibrium. Combines…
- MatrixGame.isMixedNashEq_iff_isSaddlePointNash equilibrium ↔ saddle point for matrix games. Both sides unfold to the same saddle-point inequality system; the equivalence is…
- MatrixGame.isMixedNashEq_of_purePure-strategy guarantees give a mixed Nash equilibrium. If
xxguarantees valuevagainst every pure column andyycaps the row… - MatrixGame.exists_mixed_nash_equilibriumMatrix games have a mixed Nash equilibrium — over any linearly ordered field. Packages the field-generic saddle
Minimax.minimax… - MatrixGame.IsSaddlePointA pair of mixed strategies is a saddle point when player I's payoff is maximised by the row strategy against the column strategy and…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in universe u in variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in /-- Saddle-point form of a mixed Nash equilibrium for a matrix game. For zero-sum two-player games, the standard mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is exactly the saddle point of the bilinear payoff: the row player cannot improve by deviating to any mixed row, and the column player cannot improve (i.e., decrease the row player's payoff) by deviating to any mixed column. Field-generic: the saddle-point inequalities only need a linearly ordered field, not order-completeness. -/ def MatrixGame.IsMixedNashEq {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (xx : stdSimplex 𝕜 I) (yy : stdSimplex 𝕜 J) : Prop := (∀ x' : stdSimplex 𝕜 I, A.E x' yy ≤ A.E xx yy) ∧ (∀ y' : stdSimplex 𝕜 J, A.E xx yy ≤ A.E xx y')