AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

MatrixGame.IsMixedNashEq

defimported Lean

Saddle-point form of a mixed Nash equilibrium for a matrix game. For zero-sum two-player games, the standard mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is exactly the saddle point of the bilinear payoff: the row player cannot improve by deviating to any mixed row, and the column player cannot improve (i.e., decrease the row player's payoff) by deviating to any mixed column. Field-generic: the saddle-point inequalities only need a linearly ordered field, not order-completeness.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
universe u in
variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in
def MatrixGame.IsMixedNashEq {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜]
    (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (xx : stdSimplex 𝕜 I) (yy : stdSimplex 𝕜 J) : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.IsMixedNashEq`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • MatrixGame.EExpected payoff when Player I uses mixed strategy x and Player II uses y.
  • MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row i : I, Player II chooses column j : J. Payoff to Player I is g i j…
Used by 5

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
universe u in
variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in
/-- Saddle-point form of a mixed Nash equilibrium for a matrix game. For zero-sum two-player games, the standard mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is exactly the saddle point of the bilinear payoff: the row player cannot improve by deviating to any mixed row, and the column player cannot improve (i.e., decrease the row player's payoff) by deviating to any mixed column. Field-generic: the saddle-point inequalities only need a linearly ordered field, not order-completeness. -/
def MatrixGame.IsMixedNashEq {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜]
    (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (xx : stdSimplex 𝕜 I) (yy : stdSimplex 𝕜 J) : Prop :=
  (∀ x' : stdSimplex 𝕜 I, A.E x' yy ≤ A.E xx yy) ∧
  (∀ y' : stdSimplex 𝕜 J, A.E xx yy ≤ A.E xx y')
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