MatrixGame.isMixedNashEq_iff_isSaddlePoint
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Nash equilibrium ↔ saddle point for matrix games. Both sides unfold to the same saddle-point inequality system; the equivalence is therefore definitional.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in universe u in variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in theorem MatrixGame.isMixedNashEq_iff_isSaddlePoint {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (xx : stdSimplex 𝕜 I) (yy : stdSimplex 𝕜 J) : A.IsMixedNashEq xx yy ↔ A.IsSaddlePoint xx yy
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.isMixedNashEq_iff_isSaddlePoint`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.isMixedNashEq_iff_isSaddlePoint← MatrixGame.isMixedNashEq_iff_isSaddlePoint (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGameNash.lean:81): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 3
- MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j… - MatrixGame.IsSaddlePointA pair of mixed strategies is a saddle point when player I's payoff is maximised by the row strategy against the column strategy and…
- MatrixGame.IsMixedNashEqSaddle-point form of a mixed Nash equilibrium for a matrix game. For zero-sum two-player games, the standard mixed-strategy Nash…
- MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in universe u in variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in /-- **Nash equilibrium ↔ saddle point** for matrix games. Both sides unfold to the same saddle-point inequality system; the equivalence is therefore definitional. -/ theorem MatrixGame.isMixedNashEq_iff_isSaddlePoint {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (xx : stdSimplex 𝕜 I) (yy : stdSimplex 𝕜 J) : A.IsMixedNashEq xx yy ↔ A.IsSaddlePoint xx yy := Iff.rfl