AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

MatrixGame.isMixedNashEq_iff_isSaddlePoint

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Nash equilibrium ↔ saddle point for matrix games. Both sides unfold to the same saddle-point inequality system; the equivalence is therefore definitional.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
universe u in
variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in
theorem MatrixGame.isMixedNashEq_iff_isSaddlePoint
    {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜]
    (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (xx : stdSimplex 𝕜 I) (yy : stdSimplex 𝕜 J) :
    A.IsMixedNashEq xx yy ↔ A.IsSaddlePoint xx yy
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.isMixedNashEq_iff_isSaddlePoint`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 3
  • MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row i : I, Player II chooses column j : J. Payoff to Player I is g i j…
  • MatrixGame.IsSaddlePointA pair of mixed strategies is a saddle point when player I's payoff is maximised by the row strategy against the column strategy and…
  • MatrixGame.IsMixedNashEqSaddle-point form of a mixed Nash equilibrium for a matrix game. For zero-sum two-player games, the standard mixed-strategy Nash…

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
universe u in
variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in
/-- **Nash equilibrium ↔ saddle point** for matrix games. Both sides unfold to the same saddle-point inequality system; the equivalence is therefore definitional. -/
theorem MatrixGame.isMixedNashEq_iff_isSaddlePoint
    {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜]
    (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (xx : stdSimplex 𝕜 I) (yy : stdSimplex 𝕜 J) :
    A.IsMixedNashEq xx yy ↔ A.IsSaddlePoint xx yy := Iff.rfl
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