AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

MatrixGame.maximin_le_minimax

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Maximin ≤ minimax (always holds, for any matrix game). This is the finite weak-duality inequality.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators Matrix in
variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in
theorem MatrixGame.maximin_le_minimax : A.maximin ≤ A.minimax
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.maximin_le_minimax`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 4
  • MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row i : I, Player II chooses column j : J. Payoff to Player I is g i j…
  • MatrixGame.maximinThe maximin value: the best guarantee Player I can achieve. maximin = sup_x inf_j E(x, j)
  • MinimaxLoomis.lam0_le_mu0Weak duality for the two-player zero-sum matrix game: every maxmin value is bounded by every minmax value.
  • MatrixGame.minimaxThe minimax value: the best guarantee Player II can achieve. minimax = inf_y sup_i E(i, y)
Used by 2

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators Matrix in
variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in
/-- Maximin ≤ minimax (always holds, for any matrix game). This is the finite weak-duality inequality. -/
theorem MatrixGame.maximin_le_minimax : A.maximin ≤ A.minimax :=
  MinimaxLoomis.lam0_le_mu0 A.g
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