MatrixGame.toMixedProfile_zero
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
MatrixGame.toMixedProfile_zero
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in universe u in variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J β) in variable [DecidableEq I] [DecidableEq J] in @[simp] theorem MatrixGame.toMixedProfile_zero {π : Type} [Field π] [LinearOrder π] [IsStrictOrderedRing π] (A : MatrixGame I J π) (xx : stdSimplex π I) (yy : stdSimplex π J) : A.toMixedProfile xx yy 0 = xx
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.toMixedProfile_zero`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.toMixedProfile_zero← MatrixGame.toMixedProfile_zero (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGameNash.lean:540): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 10
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategyA mixed strategy for player
i: a probability distribution over pure strategies. Requires[Fintype (G.strategy i)]but NOT[Fintype N]. - MatrixGame.toStrategicGameThe two-player zero-sum strategic game associated with a matrix game. See
MatrixGame.toStrategicGame_isZeroSumfor the proof that this⦠- MatrixGame.instDecidableEqStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGameMatrixGame.instDecidableEqStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGame
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.decidableStrategicGame.IsZeroSum.decidable
- MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j⦠- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.expectedPayoff_add_zeroMixed-strategy version of the zero-sum axiom: expected payoffs sum to
0. - MatrixGame.instNonemptyStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGameMatrixGame.instNonemptyStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGame
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a⦠- MatrixGame.toMixedProfileBuild a
MixedProfileoftoStrategicGamefrom a saddle-point pair. - MatrixGame.instFintypeStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGameMatrixGame.instFintypeStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGame
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategyA mixed strategy for player
- Used by 6
- MatrixGame.optimalColumnStrategies_image_isPolytopeMatrixGame.optimalColumnStrategies_image_isPolytope
- MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibriumThe strategic-game embedding of a finite matrix game admits a mixed Nash equilibrium. Combinesβ¦
- MatrixGame.image_optimalColumnStrategies_eqMatrixGame.image_optimalColumnStrategies_eq
- MatrixGame.optimalRowStrategies_image_isPolytopeThe row-optimal strategy set is a nonempty polytope: convex, closed, compact, and nonempty.
- MatrixGame.optimalRowSet_nonemptyMatrixGame.optimalRowSet_nonempty
- MatrixGame.optimalColumnSet_nonemptyMatrixGame.optimalColumnSet_nonempty
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in universe u in variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J β) in variable [DecidableEq I] [DecidableEq J] in @[simp] theorem MatrixGame.toMixedProfile_zero {π : Type} [Field π] [LinearOrder π] [IsStrictOrderedRing π] (A : MatrixGame I J π) (xx : stdSimplex π I) (yy : stdSimplex π J) : A.toMixedProfile xx yy 0 = xx := rfl