MechanismWithTransfers.isQuasiLinearDSIC
defimported Lean
DSIC for quasi-linear utility, as a specialization of isDSIC.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MechanismWithTransfers in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {A P V U : Type*} in variable (M : MechanismWithTransfers I T A P) in def MechanismWithTransfers.isQuasiLinearDSIC [Sub U] [Preorder U] (val : A → (∀ i, T i) → I → V) (valueToUtility : V → U) (paymentToUtility : P → U) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MechanismWithTransfers.isQuasiLinearDSIC`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MechanismWithTransfers.isQuasiLinearDSIC← MechanismWithTransfers.isQuasiLinearDSIC (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Transfer.lean:137): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 5
- MechanismWithTransfers.isDSICDSIC for a mechanism with transfers, relative to an externally supplied utility rule.
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MechanismWithTransfers in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {A P V U : Type*} in variable (M : MechanismWithTransfers I T A P) in /-- DSIC for quasi-linear utility, as a specialization of `isDSIC`. -/ def MechanismWithTransfers.isQuasiLinearDSIC [Sub U] [Preorder U] (val : A → (∀ i, T i) → I → V) (valueToUtility : V → U) (paymentToUtility : P → U) : Prop := M.isDSIC (fun a pay types i => valueToUtility (val a types i) - paymentToUtility (pay i))