MechanismWithTransfers.isDSIC
defimported Lean
DSIC for a mechanism with transfers, relative to an externally supplied utility rule.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MechanismWithTransfers in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {A P V U : Type*} in variable (M : MechanismWithTransfers I T A P) in def MechanismWithTransfers.isDSIC [Preorder U] (u : A → (I → P) → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MechanismWithTransfers.isDSIC`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MechanismWithTransfers.isDSIC← MechanismWithTransfers.isDSIC (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Transfer.lean:114): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 6
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - IsWeaklyDominantStrategy
sis weakly dominant for playeri. - MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGameThe strategic game induced by a transfer mechanism and an external utility rule. Utility is supplied as a function of: - allocation -…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
- Used by 5
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting
θᵢis weakly dominant for… - MechanismWithTransfers.isQuasiLinearDSICDSIC for quasi-linear utility, as a specialization of
isDSIC. - SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSICMyerson Lemma, Property 1: every DSIC single-parameter mechanism has a monotone allocation rule.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSICPointwise DSIC inequality for the interim utility integrand.
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_sandwichFor a DSIC single-parameter mechanism, fixing all other bids yields the standard two-sided bound on payment differences.
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MechanismWithTransfers in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {A P V U : Type*} in variable (M : MechanismWithTransfers I T A P) in /-- DSIC for a mechanism with transfers, relative to an externally supplied utility rule. -/ def MechanismWithTransfers.isDSIC [Preorder U] (u : A → (I → P) → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) : Prop := ∀ trueTypes : (∀ i, T i), ∀ i : I, IsWeaklyDominant (M.toStrategicGame u trueTypes) i (trueTypes i)