EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_self
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Deviating to the same strategy is the identity.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} in variable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} [DecidableEq N] in @[simp] theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_self (σ : G.Profile) (i : N) : deviate σ i (σ i) = σ
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_self`
- Lean proof
- By xbei, Claude (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_self← StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_self (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/Basic.lean:69): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_self--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/Basic.lean:69 (StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_self) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ -/-- Deviating to the same strategy is the identity. -/ +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +variable {N U : Type*} in +variable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} [DecidableEq N] in @[simp] -theorem deviate_self (σ : G.Profile) (i : N) : +theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_self (σ : G.Profile) (i : N) : deviate σ i (σ i) = σ := by - simp [StrategicGame.deviate] + simp [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate] - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 4
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateUnilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player
iswitches tos', while all other players keep their current strategies. - Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same value is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
- Used by 62
- IsBestResponsePlayer
iis playing a best response to profileσin gameGif no unilateral deviation to any strategys'yields a higher payoff. - IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponseT2: A weakly dominant strategy is a best response to any profile where player
iplays it. - SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2: a monotone allocation rule is DSIC when paired with the canonical Myerson payment rule.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.nash_payoff_eqIn a zero-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 0. [MSZ Theorem 4.44-4.45]
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsDominanceSolvableA game is dominance-solvable if IESDS yields a unique surviving profile.
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_difference_boundIf two payment rules implement the same allocation rule in DSIC form, then their difference along a one-dimensional deviation is…
- MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibriumThe strategic-game embedding of a finite matrix game admits a mixed Nash equilibrium. Combines…
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.ExAnteRevelationPrincipleConclusionThe revelation-principle target property attached to a strategy profile. This packages the statement we will eventually want to prove: if…
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting
θᵢis weakly dominant for… - MechanismWithTransfers.isQuasiLinearDSICDSIC for quasi-linear utility, as a specialization of
isDSIC. - SingleParameterMechanism.payment_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedUniqueness of zero-normalized DSIC payment rules: among zero-normalized payment rules, the canonical Myerson payment rule is the unique…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives.prevSurvival at round n+1 implies survival at round n.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq_p1In a constant-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 1.
- Mechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC). A mechanism is DSIC with respect to a utility function if for every true type profile…
- SingleParameterMechanism.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_payment_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma
(b): ifxis monotone, then there is a unique zero-normalized payment rule making(x, p)DSIC. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives.monoSurvival is monotone: later rounds ⊆ earlier rounds.
- IsBestResponse.congr_payoffT1: Best response depends only on player
i's payoff column. - StrictlyDominates.weaklyStrict dominance implies weak dominance.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotential.isNash_iff_localMaxNash ↔ local maximizer of ordinal potential.
- SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSICMyerson Lemma, Property 1: every DSIC single-parameter mechanism has a monotone allocation rule.
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedExplicit payment identity used in Myerson's Lemma: for a DSIC single-parameter mechanism with zero-normalized payments, the payment rule…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSICPointwise DSIC inequality for the interim utility integrand.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsRationalizableA strategy is rationalizable if it survives all rounds.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.nash_payoff_eq_p1In a zero-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 1.
- isNashEq_iffT6: The checker correctly decides Nash equilibrium (soundness and completeness).
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibriumAn ex-ante Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a transfer mechanism. No agent can improve their ex-ante expected utility by replacing their…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- IsNashEquilibriumA profile
σis a pure Nash equilibrium of gameGif every player is playing a best response: no player can profitably deviate. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsExactPotentialAn exact potential function: the change in
Φequals the change in the deviating player's payoff. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotentialAn ordinal potential function: a unilateral deviation improves payoff iff it increases Φ.
- Mechanism.IsDSIC.truthful_isNashIf a mechanism is DSIC, then truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium.
- WeaklyDominatesStrategy
sweakly dominates strategys'for playeri. - IsStrictlyDominant.isWeaklyDominantA strictly dominant strategy is weakly dominant.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueComparable_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueComparable_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.isRationalizableNash strategies are rationalizable.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.SurvivesA strategy survives round
nof iterated strict dominance elimination. Round 0: all strategies survive. Round n+1:ssurvives if it… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_of_isDSICDSIC implies interim IC under interim integrability.
- MechanismWithTransfers.isDSICDSIC for a mechanism with transfers, relative to an externally supplied utility rule.
- IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominantT3: If every player has a weakly dominant strategy and
σassigns each player their dominant strategy, thenσis a Nash equilibrium. - StrictlyDominatesStrategy
sstrictly dominates strategys'for playeri. - SingleParameterMechanism.IsImplementableAn allocation rule is implementable if there exists some payment rule such that the resulting single-parameter mechanism is DSIC.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEqA degenerate correlated equilibrium supported on a single profile. This is the only honest correlated-equilibrium notion currently…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_paymentRule_for_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_paymentRule_for_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule
- SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2, reformulated: an allocation rule is implementable if it is monotone.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isImplementable_of_isRegularBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isImplementable_of_isRegular
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalized
- isNashEqExecutable Nash equilibrium checker. Returns
trueiffσis a pure Nash equilibrium ofG. - IsStrictlyDominantStrategy
sis strictly dominant for playeri. - Auction.FirstPrice.no_dominant_strategyNo dominant strategy exists in first-price auctions. For any bidder
iand any bidbi, there exists a profile where biddingbiis… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsExactPotential.maximizer_is_nashA profile maximizing an exact potential is a Nash equilibrium.
- SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_iff_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma
(a): an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it is monotone. - BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnte_revelation_principleRevelation principle, ex-ante form: if
σis a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the indirect mechanism, then truthful reporting is a Bayesian… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_eq_myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_eq_myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survivesNash equilibrium strategies survive all rounds. [MSZ 4.31]
- IsWeaklyDominantStrategy
sis weakly dominant for playeri. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eqIn a constant-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 0. [MSZ Theorem 4.44–4.45]
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_zeroNormalized_and_isDSICMyerson Lemma
(c): the unique zero-normalized DSIC payment rule from(b)is given by the explicit formula… - SingleParameterMechanism.payment_sandwichFor a DSIC single-parameter mechanism, fixing all other bids yields the standard two-sided bound on payment differences.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.nash_iff_degenerate_ceA profile is a "degenerate" correlated equilibrium (point mass on one profile) if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium.
- IsBestResponsePlayer
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N U : Type*} invariable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} [DecidableEq N] in/-- Deviating to the same strategy is the identity. -/@[simp]theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_self (σ : G.Profile) (i : N) : deviate σ i (σ i) = σ := by simp [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate]