MultipleParameterMechanism.exists_efficientAllocation
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
There exists an allocation maximizing reported social welfare.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in lemma MultipleParameterMechanism.exists_efficientAllocation (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) : ∃ a : A, ∀ b : A, socialWelfare v b ≤ socialWelfare v a
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MultipleParameterMechanism.exists_efficientAllocation`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MultipleParameterMechanism.exists_efficientAllocation← MultipleParameterMechanism.exists_efficientAllocation (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/VCG.lean:59): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 3
- MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfareReported social welfare of allocation
aunder a profile of valuations. - MultipleParameterMechanism.maxSocialWelfareThe maximum reported social welfare over all allocations.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.ValuationThe valuation/type space of an agent in a multiple-parameter mechanism.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfareReported social welfare of allocation
- Used by 2
- MultipleParameterMechanism.efficientAllocation_isOptimalThe chosen VCG allocation maximizes reported social welfare.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.efficientAllocationA welfare-maximizing allocation, chosen noncomputably from finite
A.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen scoped BigOperators invariable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in/-- There exists an allocation maximizing reported social welfare. -/lemma MultipleParameterMechanism.exists_efficientAllocation (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) : ∃ a : A, ∀ b : A, socialWelfare v b ≤ socialWelfare v a := by classical obtain ⟨a, _ha_mem, ha⟩ := Finset.exists_mem_eq_sup' (s := (Finset.univ : Finset A)) (H := Finset.univ_nonempty) (f := socialWelfare v) refine ⟨a, ?_⟩ intro b have hb : socialWelfare v b ≤ maxSocialWelfare v := by exact Finset.le_sup' (socialWelfare v) (Finset.mem_univ b) simpa [maxSocialWelfare, ha] using hb