MultipleParameterMechanism.Valuation
abbrevimported Lean
The valuation/type space of an agent in a multiple-parameter mechanism.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I A V : Type*} in abbrev MultipleParameterMechanism.Valuation (A : Type*) (V : Type*)
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MultipleParameterMechanism.Valuation`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MultipleParameterMechanism.Valuation← MultipleParameterMechanism.Valuation (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Transfer.lean:261): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 23
- MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithoutReported social welfare of all agents except
i. - MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout_update_selfChanging agent
i's report does not change the welfare of agents other thani. - MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfareReported social welfare of allocation
aunder a profile of valuations. - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegIf agent
ireports truthfully in the VCG mechanism, then their quasi-linear utility is nonnegative against arbitrary reports by the… - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGTransferMechanismThe underlying transfer mechanism of
VCGMechanism. This is the object to which the generic definitions inTransfer.lean, such as… - MultipleParameterMechanism.maxWelfareWithout_update_selfChanging agent
i's report does not change the maximum welfare achievable by the other agents. - MultipleParameterMechanism.vcgPaymentThe Clarke-pivot VCG payment charged to agent
i: the best welfare that the other agents could get withouti, minus the other agents'… - MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout_le_socialWelfare_of_nonneg_iIf agent
i's valuation is nonnegative, then the welfare of agents other thaniis bounded by total social welfare. - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_quasiLinearUtility_eq_socialWelfare_sub_maxWelfareWithoutVCG utility can be rewritten as total welfare under the profile that uses agent
i's true valuation and keeps all other reports fixed,… - MultipleParameterMechanism.withoutAllocation_isOptimalThe chosen allocation without agent
imaximizes the reported welfare of the other agents. - MultipleParameterMechanism.efficientAllocation_isOptimalThe chosen VCG allocation maximizes reported social welfare.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.withoutAllocationA welfare-maximizing allocation for agents other than
i. - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_profile_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegThe same nonnegative-utility result for the fully truthful report profile.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.maxWelfareWithoutThe maximum reported welfare of agents other than
i. - MultipleParameterMechanism.maxSocialWelfareThe maximum reported social welfare over all allocations.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfare_eq_value_add_welfareWithoutSocial welfare decomposes into agent
i's value plus the welfare of the other agents. - MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout_le_socialWelfareIf all valuations are nonnegative, then the welfare of agents other than
iis bounded by total social welfare. - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_isExPostIR_of_all_nonnegativeVCG satisfies the
MechanismWithTransfers.isExPostIRpredicate under the ambient assumption that every valuation in the unrestricted type… - MultipleParameterMechanism.exists_efficientAllocationThere exists an allocation maximizing reported social welfare.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.valueOfAllocationThe value extractor used by the generic quasi-linear transfer definitions: agent
ievaluates allocationaby applying their valuation… - CombinatorialAuction.IsFeasibleFeasibility: each item is allocated to at most one agent.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.exists_withoutAllocationThere exists an allocation maximizing the reported welfare of agents other than
i. - MultipleParameterMechanism.efficientAllocationA welfare-maximizing allocation, chosen noncomputably from finite
A.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithoutReported social welfare of all agents except
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I A V : Type*} in /-- The valuation/type space of an agent in a multiple-parameter mechanism. -/ abbrev MultipleParameterMechanism.Valuation (A : Type*) (V : Type*) := A → V