MultipleParameterMechanism.efficientAllocation_isOptimal
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
The chosen VCG allocation maximizes reported social welfare.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in lemma MultipleParameterMechanism.efficientAllocation_isOptimal (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (a : A) : socialWelfare v a ≤ socialWelfare v (efficientAllocation v)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MultipleParameterMechanism.efficientAllocation_isOptimal`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MultipleParameterMechanism.efficientAllocation_isOptimal← MultipleParameterMechanism.efficientAllocation_isOptimal (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/VCG.lean:76): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 4
- MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfareReported social welfare of allocation
aunder a profile of valuations. - MultipleParameterMechanism.ValuationThe valuation/type space of an agent in a multiple-parameter mechanism.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.exists_efficientAllocationThere exists an allocation maximizing reported social welfare.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.efficientAllocationA welfare-maximizing allocation, chosen noncomputably from finite
A.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfareReported social welfare of allocation
- Used by 1
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegIf agent
ireports truthfully in the VCG mechanism, then their quasi-linear utility is nonnegative against arbitrary reports by the…
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegIf agent
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in /-- The chosen VCG allocation maximizes reported social welfare. -/ lemma MultipleParameterMechanism.efficientAllocation_isOptimal (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (a : A) : socialWelfare v a ≤ socialWelfare v (efficientAllocation v) := Classical.choose_spec (exists_efficientAllocation v) a