MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfare
defimported Lean
Reported social welfare of allocation a under a profile of valuations.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in def MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfare (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (a : A) : ℝ
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfare`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfare← MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfare (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/VCG.lean:51): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- MultipleParameterMechanism.ValuationThe valuation/type space of an agent in a multiple-parameter mechanism.
- Used by 9
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegIf agent
ireports truthfully in the VCG mechanism, then their quasi-linear utility is nonnegative against arbitrary reports by the… - MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout_le_socialWelfare_of_nonneg_iIf agent
i's valuation is nonnegative, then the welfare of agents other thaniis bounded by total social welfare. - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_quasiLinearUtility_eq_socialWelfare_sub_maxWelfareWithoutVCG utility can be rewritten as total welfare under the profile that uses agent
i's true valuation and keeps all other reports fixed,… - MultipleParameterMechanism.efficientAllocation_isOptimalThe chosen VCG allocation maximizes reported social welfare.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.maxSocialWelfareThe maximum reported social welfare over all allocations.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfare_eq_value_add_welfareWithoutSocial welfare decomposes into agent
i's value plus the welfare of the other agents. - MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout_le_socialWelfareIf all valuations are nonnegative, then the welfare of agents other than
iis bounded by total social welfare. - MultipleParameterMechanism.exists_efficientAllocationThere exists an allocation maximizing reported social welfare.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.efficientAllocationA welfare-maximizing allocation, chosen noncomputably from finite
A.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegIf agent
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in /-- Reported social welfare of allocation `a` under a profile of valuations. -/ def MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfare (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (a : A) : ℝ := ∑ i, v i a