SingleItemAuction
structureimported Lean
A single-item auction. One indivisible item is for sale. Each agent reports a scalar bid of type V. The allocation is Option I: - some i — bidder i receives the item - none — the item is withheld (reserve price not met, etc.) Which bidder wins, or whether anyone wins, is determined by the allocation rule of the specific mechanism. This structure imposes no winner-selection policy.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in structure SingleItemAuction (I : Type*) (V : Type*) (P : Type*) extends MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => V) (Option I) P
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SingleItemAuction`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SingleItemAuction← SingleItemAuction (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/AuctionBasic.lean:89): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space…
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in /-- A single-item auction. One indivisible item is for sale. Each agent reports a scalar bid of type `V`. The allocation is `Option I`: - `some i` — bidder `i` receives the item - `none` — the item is withheld (reserve price not met, etc.) Which bidder wins, or whether anyone wins, is determined by the allocation rule of the specific mechanism. This structure imposes no winner-selection policy. -/ structure SingleItemAuction (I : Type*) (V : Type*) (P : Type*) extends MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => V) (Option I) P