AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SingleItemAuction

structureimported Lean

A single-item auction. One indivisible item is for sale. Each agent reports a scalar bid of type V. The allocation is Option I: - some i — bidder i receives the item - none — the item is withheld (reserve price not met, etc.) Which bidder wins, or whether anyone wins, is determined by the allocation rule of the specific mechanism. This structure imposes no winner-selection policy.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
structure SingleItemAuction (I : Type*) (V : Type*) (P : Type*)
    extends MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => V) (Option I) P
Defined in
EconCSLib, `SingleItemAuction`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 1
  • MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. - I — agents - T — report/type space of each agent - A — allocation space - P — payment space…

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
/-- A single-item auction. One indivisible item is for sale. Each agent reports a scalar bid of type `V`. The allocation is `Option I`: - `some i` — bidder `i` receives the item - `none` — the item is withheld (reserve price not met, etc.) Which bidder wins, or whether anyone wins, is determined by the allocation rule of the specific mechanism. This structure imposes no winner-selection policy. -/
structure SingleItemAuction (I : Type*) (V : Type*) (P : Type*)
    extends MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => V) (Option I) P
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