Auction.SecondPrice.mechanism
defimported Lean
The second-price auction as a MechanismWithTransfers. Agents report bids in U (their type space is homogeneous: T i = U). - Allocation: the winner index (element of I) - Payments: the winner pays secondPrice b; all losers pay 0. This is the canonical MechanismWithTransfers instance from which the strategic game and DSIC statement are derived. [AGT Ch. 9]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in variable {v : I → U} in noncomputable def Auction.SecondPrice.mechanism : MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => U) I U
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `Auction.SecondPrice.mechanism`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.SecondPrice.mechanism← Auction.SecondPrice.mechanism (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Vickrey.lean:194): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 3
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - Auction.SecondPrice.secondPriceThe second price: the highest bid among all bidders other than the winner.
- Auction.SecondPrice.winnerThe winner of the second-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
Auction.argmaxBidfrom…
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in variable {v : I → U} in /-- The second-price auction as a `MechanismWithTransfers`. Agents report bids in `U` (their type space is homogeneous: `T i = U`). - Allocation: the winner index (element of `I`) - Payments: the winner pays `secondPrice b`; all losers pay `0`. This is the canonical `MechanismWithTransfers` instance from which the strategic game and DSIC statement are derived. [AGT Ch. 9] -/ noncomputable def Auction.SecondPrice.mechanism : MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => U) I U where allocationRule b := winner b paymentRule b i := if i = winner b then secondPrice b else 0