MultipleParameterMechanism
structureimported Lean
A multiple-parameter mechanism with transfers. Here A is the type of feasible allocations and V is the codomain of valuations. Agent i's type/report space is A → V: a valuation function assigning a value to every possible allocation. The mechanism then maps a profile of reported valuations to an allocation and a payment for each agent.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in structure MultipleParameterMechanism (I : Type*) (A : Type*) (V : Type*) (P : Type*) extends MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => A → V) A P
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MultipleParameterMechanism`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MultipleParameterMechanism← MultipleParameterMechanism (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Transfer.lean:252): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space…
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
- Used by 8
- CombinatorialAuctionA combinatorial auction with
kdistinct items. This is a multiple-parameter mechanism whose allocation space is the type of… - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanismThe finite-allocation VCG mechanism induced by welfare maximization and Clarke-pivot payments.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegIf agent
ireports truthfully in the VCG mechanism, then their quasi-linear utility is nonnegative against arbitrary reports by the… - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGTransferMechanismThe underlying transfer mechanism of
VCGMechanism. This is the object to which the generic definitions inTransfer.lean, such as… - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_quasiLinearUtility_eq_socialWelfare_sub_maxWelfareWithoutVCG utility can be rewritten as total welfare under the profile that uses agent
i's true valuation and keeps all other reports fixed,… - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_profile_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegThe same nonnegative-utility result for the fully truthful report profile.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_isExPostIR_of_all_nonnegativeVCG satisfies the
MechanismWithTransfers.isExPostIRpredicate under the ambient assumption that every valuation in the unrestricted type… - CombinatorialAuction.IsFeasibleFeasibility: each item is allocated to at most one agent.
- CombinatorialAuctionA combinatorial auction with
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in /-- A multiple-parameter mechanism with transfers. Here `A` is the type of feasible allocations and `V` is the codomain of valuations. Agent `i`'s type/report space is `A → V`: a valuation function assigning a value to every possible allocation. The mechanism then maps a profile of reported valuations to an allocation and a payment for each agent. -/ structure MultipleParameterMechanism (I : Type*) (A : Type*) (V : Type*) (P : Type*) extends MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => A → V) A P