SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CakeValuation
structureimported Lean
An abstract cake valuation assigns a value in V to each agent-piece pair.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MeasureTheory Set in structure SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CakeValuation (N Ω V : Type*)
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CakeValuation`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CakeValuation← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CakeValuation (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Divisible/Valuation.lean:25): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 13
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureValuation.val_unionFor disjoint measurable sets,
MeasureValuationis additive. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutter_isEnvyFree_of_fairThe cutter (agent 0) does not envy the chooser at a fair cut. If the cut point
tsatisfiesIsFairCutPoint μ t, then agent 0 values… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutAndChoose_isEnvyFreeBoth agents are envy-free at any fair cut point. This combines
chooser_isEnvyFree(unconditional) andcutter_isEnvyFree_of_fair… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsEnvyFreeEnvy-free (EF): every agent weakly prefers their own piece over any other agent's piece.
∀ i j, μ_i(A_j) ≤ μ_i(A_i). For divisible goods… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureValuation.val_emptyThe value of the empty piece is zero.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureInstance.toCakeValuationThe raw cake valuation induced by a measure instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureValuation.val_iUnionFor a countably-indexed pairwise-disjoint family of measurable sets,
MeasureValuationis countably additive (tsum). - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsEquitableEquitable: every agent assigns exactly the same value to their own piece.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureValuationA measure-based cake valuation: each agent's value for a piece is given by their personal measure
μ ion the cakeΩ. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsProportionalProportional (PROP): each agent values their piece at least
1 / nof the whole cake. Stated asμ_i(Ω) ≤ n * μ_i(A_i)to avoid division. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.ds_oneBase case: 1 agent receives the whole cake. Proportionality holds trivially on the whole unit interval.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.chooser_isEnvyFreeThe chooser (agent 1) never envies the cutter, regardless of the cut point. Since agent 1 selects whichever piece they value more,…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsNormalizedA normalized cake valuation: each agent values the whole cake at exactly
1.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureValuation.val_unionFor disjoint measurable sets,
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MeasureTheory Set in /-- An abstract cake valuation assigns a value in `V` to each agent-piece pair. -/ structure SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CakeValuation (N Ω V : Type*) where /-- The valuation function: agent × cake-piece → value. -/ val : N → Set Ω → V