AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsProportional

defimported Lean

Proportional (PROP): each agent values their piece at least 1 / n of the whole cake. Stated as μ_i(Ω) ≤ n * μ_i(A_i) to avoid division.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open MeasureTheory Set in
def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsProportional {N Ω V : Type*} [Preorder V] [Semiring V] (n : ℕ)
    (μ : CakeValuation N Ω V) (A : Allocation N Ω) : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsProportional`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
Used by 4

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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open MeasureTheory Set in
/-- Proportional (PROP): each agent values their piece at least `1 / n` of the whole cake. Stated as `μ_i(Ω) ≤ n * μ_i(A_i)` to avoid division. -/
def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsProportional {N Ω V : Type*} [Preorder V] [Semiring V] (n : ℕ)
    (μ : CakeValuation N Ω V) (A : Allocation N Ω) : Prop :=
  ∀ i : N, μ.val i Set.univ ≤ (n : V) * μ.val i (A i)
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