AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsEnvyFree

defimported Lean

Envy-free (EF): every agent weakly prefers their own piece over any other agent's piece. ∀ i j, μ_i(A_j) ≤ μ_i(A_i). For divisible goods with non-atomic measures, EF allocations always exist. This is the key difference from the indivisible setting where EF need not exist.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open MeasureTheory Set in
def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsEnvyFree {N Ω V : Type*} [Preorder V]
    (μ : CakeValuation N Ω V) (A : Allocation N Ω) : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsEnvyFree`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open MeasureTheory Set in
/-- Envy-free (EF): every agent weakly prefers their own piece over any other agent's piece. `∀ i j, μ_i(A_j) ≤ μ_i(A_i)`. For divisible goods with non-atomic measures, EF allocations always exist. This is the key difference from the indivisible setting where EF need not exist. -/
def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsEnvyFree {N Ω V : Type*} [Preorder V]
    (μ : CakeValuation N Ω V) (A : Allocation N Ω) : Prop :=
  ∀ i j : N, μ.val i (A j) ≤ μ.val i (A i)
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