SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutAndChoose_isEnvyFree
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Both agents are envy-free at any fair cut point. This combines chooser_isEnvyFree (unconditional) and cutter_isEnvyFree_of_fair (requires fair cut) to give the full IsEnvyFree predicate for both agents.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MeasureTheory Set in open scoped unitInterval in theorem SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutAndChoose_isEnvyFree (μ : Fin 2 → Measure I) (t : I) (hfair : IsFairCutPoint μ t) : IsEnvyFree (MeasureValuation μ) (cutAndChooseAlloc μ t)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutAndChoose_isEnvyFree`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutAndChoose_isEnvyFree← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutAndChoose_isEnvyFree (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Divisible/CutAndChoose.lean:193): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 13
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutAndChooseAlloc_zeroCutter (agent 0) receives the right piece when the chooser prefers left, and the left piece otherwise.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CakeValuationAn abstract cake valuation assigns a value in
Vto each agent-piece pair. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutter_isEnvyFree_of_fairThe cutter (agent 0) does not envy the chooser at a fair cut. If the cut point
tsatisfiesIsFairCutPoint μ t, then agent 0 values… - TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
≤is total (complete). This is weaker thanLinearOrder— it does NOT require antisymmetry or… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsEnvyFreeEnvy-free (EF): every agent weakly prefers their own piece over any other agent's piece.
∀ i j, μ_i(A_j) ≤ μ_i(A_i). For divisible goods… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureValuation.val_emptyThe value of the empty piece is zero.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureValuationA measure-based cake valuation: each agent's value for a piece is given by their personal measure
μ ion the cakeΩ. - LinearOrder.toTotalPreorderEvery
LinearOrderis aTotalPreorder. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfare_uniqueFor a unique agent, utilitarian welfare is just that agent's utility.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsFairCutPointA cut point
tis fair (for the cutter, agent 0) if agent 0's measure is split equally:μ 0 [0, t] = μ 0 (t, 1]. At a fair cut the… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutAndChooseAllocThe cut-and-choose allocation at cut point
t ∈ [0,1]. The chooser (agent 1) receives the half they value more: - If… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.chooser_isEnvyFreeThe chooser (agent 1) never envies the cutter, regardless of the cut point. Since agent 1 selects whichever piece they value more,…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutAndChooseAlloc_oneChooser (agent 1) receives the left piece if they prefer it, the right piece otherwise.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen MeasureTheory Set inopen scoped unitInterval in/-- **Both agents are envy-free** at any fair cut point. This combines `chooser_isEnvyFree` (unconditional) and `cutter_isEnvyFree_of_fair` (requires fair cut) to give the full `IsEnvyFree` predicate for both agents. -/theorem SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutAndChoose_isEnvyFree (μ : Fin 2 → Measure I) (t : I) (hfair : IsFairCutPoint μ t) : IsEnvyFree (MeasureValuation μ) (cutAndChooseAlloc μ t) := by intro i j fin_cases i <;> fin_cases j · exact le_refl _ · exact cutter_isEnvyFree_of_fair μ t hfair · exact chooser_isEnvyFree μ t · exact le_refl _