SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.Allocation
abbrevimported Lean
A divisible allocation assigns each agent i : N a piece (a measurable subset) of the cake Ω.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MeasureTheory Set in abbrev SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.Allocation (N Ω : Type*)
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.Allocation`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.Allocation← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.Allocation (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Divisible/Allocation.lean:27): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.AllocationA fair-division allocation assigns each agent a share.
- Used by 24
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsEnvyFreeEnvy-free (EF): every agent weakly prefers their own piece over any other agent's piece.
∀ i j, μ_i(A_j) ≤ μ_i(A_i). For divisible goods… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsContiguousAllocationA contiguous allocation on
ℝ: each agent's piece is an interval (an order-connected subset ofℝ). - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureValuation.val_iUnionFor a countably-indexed pairwise-disjoint family of measurable sets,
MeasureValuationis countably additive (tsum). - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsEquitableEquitable: every agent assigns exactly the same value to their own piece.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.Instance.feasibleFeasibility for a divisible instance: an allocation is a measurable partition of the cake.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.IsParetoOptimalPareto optimality for a divisible cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureInstance.IsProportionalProportionality for a measure-based divisible instance, stated in
ENNReal. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.IsEquitableEquitability for a divisible cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsAllocationA complete divisible allocation is a measurable partition of the cake.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.egalitarianWelfareEgalitarian welfare for a divisible cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.feasibleFeasibility for a cardinal divisible instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureInstance.IsEquitableEquitability for a measure-based divisible instance, stated in
ENNReal. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureInstance.IsEnvyFree.isProportionalEnvy-freeness implies proportionality for complete measure-based divisible allocations.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureInstance.isEnvyFree_iff_toCardinalInstance_isEnvyFreeFor finite measure instances, the raw
ENNRealenvy-freeness predicate agrees with the real-valued cardinal predicate induced bytoReal. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsProportionalProportional (PROP): each agent values their piece at least
1 / nof the whole cake. Stated asμ_i(Ω) ≤ n * μ_i(A_i)to avoid division. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.ds_oneBase case: 1 agent receives the whole cake. Proportionality holds trivially on the whole unit interval.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureInstance.feasibleFeasibility for a measure-based divisible instance. Like the ordinal and cardinal divisible cases, this depends only on the ambient cake:…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutAndChooseAllocThe cut-and-choose allocation at cut point
t ∈ [0,1]. The chooser (agent 1) receives the half they value more: - If… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.IsProportionalProportionality for a divisible cardinal instance, relative to the whole cake.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.IsEnvyFreeEnvy-freeness for a divisible cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.DubinsSpanierPropThe inductive predicate for the Dubins–Spanier algorithm: for n agents indexed by
Fin n, a complete proportional allocation exists. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.utilitarianWelfareUtilitarian welfare for a divisible cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsEnvyFree.isProportionalEF implies proportional for
MeasureValuationpartitions. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureInstance.IsEnvyFreeEnvy-freeness for a measure-based divisible instance, stated in
ENNReal.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsEnvyFreeEnvy-free (EF): every agent weakly prefers their own piece over any other agent's piece.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MeasureTheory Set in /-- A divisible allocation assigns each agent `i : N` a piece (a measurable subset) of the cake `Ω`. -/ abbrev SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.Allocation (N Ω : Type*) := SocialChoice.FairDivision.Allocation N (Set Ω)