SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxmin
abbrevimported Lean
Maximin (egalitarian) optimal: no complete allocation of allGoods achieves higher egalitarian (minimum-agent) welfare. A maximin allocation makes the worst-off agent as well off as possible. This is the egalitarian counterpart to utilitarian optimality, and is distinct from the per-agent maximin share guarantee (IsMaxminShare in Fairness.lean): - IsMaxmin is a global property: it is the best possible for the social minimum. - IsMaxminShare is per-agent: each agent individually gets at least their MMS value. [Nonempty N] ensures egalitarianWelfare is well-defined. [BCM Ch.12, Def 12.6]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BigOperators Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in abbrev SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxmin [Fintype N] [Nonempty N] [DecidableEq G] (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxmin`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxmin← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxmin (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Indivisible/SocialWelfare.lean:106): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 6
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
i : Na bundle (a finite subset of goodsG). This is a plain function type alias. The partition… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAllocationA complete allocation partitions all goods among agents. *
disjoint: distinct agents receive disjoint bundles. *complete: every good… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.AllocationA fair-division allocation assigns each agent a share.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsMaxminMaximin optimality: no feasible allocation has larger egalitarian welfare.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.ValuationAn abstract valuation assigns a real value to each agent-bundle pair.
val i Sis the value agentiassigns to bundleS. Lives in… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfare_uniqueFor a unique agent, utilitarian welfare is just that agent's utility.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BigOperators Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in /-- Maximin (egalitarian) optimal: no complete allocation of `allGoods` achieves higher egalitarian (minimum-agent) welfare. A maximin allocation makes the worst-off agent as well off as possible. This is the egalitarian counterpart to utilitarian optimality, and is distinct from the per-agent maximin share guarantee (`IsMaxminShare` in `Fairness.lean`): - `IsMaxmin` is a global property: it is the best possible for the social minimum. - `IsMaxminShare` is per-agent: each agent individually gets at least their MMS value. `[Nonempty N]` ensures `egalitarianWelfare` is well-defined. [BCM Ch.12, Def 12.6] -/ abbrev SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxmin [Fintype N] [Nonempty N] [DecidableEq G] (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop := SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsMaxmin (fun B => IsAllocation allGoods B) v.val A