SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsMaxmin
defimported Lean
Maximin optimality: no feasible allocation has larger egalitarian welfare.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BigOperators in variable {N S : Type*} in def SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsMaxmin [Fintype N] [Nonempty N] (feasible : Allocation N S → Prop) (u : N → S → ℝ) (A : Allocation N S) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsMaxmin`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsMaxmin← SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsMaxmin (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Welfare.lean:41): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.egalitarianWelfareEgalitarian welfare: the minimum utility among agents.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.AllocationA fair-division allocation assigns each agent a share.
- Used by 2
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsMaxminMaximin optimality for a cardinal instance, using the instance feasibility predicate.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxminMaximin (egalitarian) optimal: no complete allocation of
allGoodsachieves higher egalitarian (minimum-agent) welfare. A maximin…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BigOperators in variable {N S : Type*} in /-- Maximin optimality: no feasible allocation has larger egalitarian welfare. -/ def SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsMaxmin [Fintype N] [Nonempty N] (feasible : Allocation N S → Prop) (u : N → S → ℝ) (A : Allocation N S) : Prop := ∀ B : Allocation N S, feasible B → egalitarianWelfare u B ≤ egalitarianWelfare u A