SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsMaxmin
defimported Lean
Maximin optimality for a cardinal instance, using the instance feasibility predicate.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in def SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsMaxmin {N R S : Type*} [Fintype N] [Nonempty N] (I : CardinalInstance N R S) (A : Allocation N S) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsMaxmin`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsMaxmin← SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsMaxmin (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Cardinal.lean:106): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 4
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstanceA real-valued cardinal fair-division instance in the standard no-externality model.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.AllocationA fair-division allocation assigns each agent a share.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsMaxminMaximin optimality: no feasible allocation has larger egalitarian welfare.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfare_uniqueFor a unique agent, utilitarian welfare is just that agent's utility.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in /-- Maximin optimality for a cardinal instance, using the instance feasibility predicate. -/ def SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsMaxmin {N R S : Type*} [Fintype N] [Nonempty N] (I : CardinalInstance N R S) (A : Allocation N S) : Prop := SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsMaxmin I.feasible I.utility A