SocialChoice.Voting.copeland
defimported Lean
Copeland winners.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Classical in open Finset in open scoped BigOperators in variable {N A : Type*} in noncomputable def SocialChoice.Voting.copeland [Fintype N] [Fintype A] : VotingRule N A
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.copeland`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.copeland← SocialChoice.Voting.copeland (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/VotingRules.lean:257): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 4
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRuleA set-valued voting rule on fixed finite voter and candidate types.
- SocialChoice.Voting.copelandScoreCopeland score: pairwise majority wins minus pairwise majority losses.
- Used by 1
- SocialChoice.Voting.copeland_isTotalSocialChoice.Voting.copeland_isTotal
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Classical in open Finset in open scoped BigOperators in variable {N A : Type*} in /-- Copeland winners. -/ noncomputable def SocialChoice.Voting.copeland [Fintype N] [Fintype A] : VotingRule N A := by intro P classical by_cases hA : (Finset.univ : Finset A).Nonempty · let maxScore : Int := (Finset.univ.image (fun a => copelandScore P a)).max' (hA.image _) exact Finset.univ.filter (fun a => copelandScore P a = maxScore) · exact ∅