SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRule
abbrevimported Lean
A set-valued voting rule on fixed finite voter and candidate types.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in abbrev SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRule (N A : Type*) [Fintype N] [Fintype A]
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRule`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRule← SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRule (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:208): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- Used by 22
- SocialChoice.Voting.ResoluteA voting rule is resolute if it always returns exactly one winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.PessimistStrategyproofnessPessimist strategyproofness for set-valued rules.
- SocialChoice.Voting.pluralityPlurality rule.
- SocialChoice.Voting.bordaBorda rule.
- SocialChoice.Voting.vetoVeto rule.
- SocialChoice.Voting.MonotonicityMonotonicity: raising a selected alternative cannot make it unselected.
- SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choiceSocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice
- SocialChoice.Voting.scoringRuleGeneric positional scoring rule. The first argument is the number of alternatives, and the second is the zero-based rank.
- SocialChoice.Voting.ResoluteStrategyproofnessStrategyproofness for resolute rules: changing one ballot cannot produce a strictly better unique winner for the deviating voter.
- SocialChoice.Voting.copelandCopeland winners.
- SocialChoice.Voting.UnanimityUnanimity/Pareto for set-valued voting rules: no unanimously dominated alternative is selected.
- SocialChoice.Voting.DictatorialA rule is dictatorial if one voter always gets their top-ranked alternative as the unique winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.unanimous_strict_pref_not_chosenIf every voter strictly prefers
atob, then a unanimous monotonic resolute voting rule cannot chooseb. This is the set-valued… - SocialChoice.Voting.IsTotalA voting rule is total if it always returns at least one winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.OptimistStrategyproofnessOptimist strategyproofness for set-valued rules.
- SocialChoice.Voting.CondorcetConsistencyA rule is Condorcet-consistent if every Condorcet winner is the unique winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.AnonymityAnonymity: relabeling voters does not change the winner set.
- SocialChoice.Voting.NeutralityNeutrality: relabeling candidates relabels the winner set.
- SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_monotonicStrategy-proofness implies monotonicity for finite voter sets. [MSZ 21.35]
- SocialChoice.Voting.ParetoEfficiencyAlias for voting-rule unanimity in its weak-Pareto form.
- SocialChoice.Voting.top_unanimity_of_unanimityTop unanimity follows from weak-Pareto unanimity plus totality: if every voter ranks
afirst, thenais the unique winner. - SocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_memSocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_mem
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in /-- A set-valued voting rule on fixed finite voter and candidate types. -/ abbrev SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRule (N A : Type*) [Fintype N] [Fintype A] := Profile N A → Finset A