SocialChoice.Voting.exists_nonempty_decisive_of_size
defimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.exists_nonempty_decisive_of_size
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N A : Type*} in def SocialChoice.Voting.exists_nonempty_decisive_of_size [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (F : SWF N A) (n : Nat) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.exists_nonempty_decisive_of_size`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.exists_nonempty_decisive_of_size← SocialChoice.Voting.exists_nonempty_decisive_of_size (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Decisive.lean:503): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 4
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWFA social welfare function maps strict profiles to a weak social preference.
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveA coalition is decisive if it is decisive for every ordered pair of alternatives.
- Used by 1
- SocialChoice.Voting.exists_minimal_decisive_coalitionSocialChoice.Voting.exists_minimal_decisive_coalition
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N A : Type*} in def SocialChoice.Voting.exists_nonempty_decisive_of_size [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (F : SWF N A) (n : Nat) : Prop := ∃ C : Set N, C.Nonempty ∧ IsDecisive F C ∧ C.ncard = n