SocialChoice.Voting.SWF
abbrevimported Lean
A social welfare function maps strict profiles to a weak social preference.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in abbrev SocialChoice.Voting.SWF (N A : Type*) [Fintype N] [Fintype A]
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.SWF`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.SWF← SocialChoice.Voting.SWF (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:220): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 3
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- PrefA bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use…
- Used by 17
- SocialChoice.Voting.exists_nonempty_decisive_of_sizeSocialChoice.Voting.exists_nonempty_decisive_of_size
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.IsDictatorAn individual is a dictator exactly when their singleton coalition is decisive.
- SocialChoice.Voting.unanimity_univ_isDecisiveSocialChoice.Voting.unanimity_univ_isDecisive
- SocialChoice.Voting.iia_strictSocialChoice.Voting.iia_strict
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.IIAIndependence of irrelevant alternatives for SWFs.
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.NonDictatorialA SWF is non-dictatorial.
- SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forwardSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forward
- SocialChoice.Voting.exists_minimal_decisive_coalitionSocialChoice.Voting.exists_minimal_decisive_coalition
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.UnanimityUnanimity/Pareto for SWFs: unanimous strict preference forces social strict preference.
- SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_isDictatorSocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_isDictator
- SocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveForSocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveFor
- SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_reflSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_refl
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveA coalition is decisive if it is decisive for every ordered pair of alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveForA coalition is decisive for
aoverbif unanimous strict support inside the coalition forces the social strict preferencea ≻ b. - SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.DictatorialA SWF is dictatorial if one voter always determines every strict social comparison.
- SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorialSocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorial
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsWeaklyDecisiveForWeak decisiveness tests a coalition against a complement unanimously supporting the opposite strict ranking.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in /-- A social welfare function maps strict profiles to a weak social preference. -/ abbrev SocialChoice.Voting.SWF (N A : Type*) [Fintype N] [Fintype A] := Profile N A → Pref A