SocialChoice.Voting.plurality_isTotal
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.plurality_isTotal
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Classical in open Finset in open scoped BigOperators in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.plurality_isTotal [Fintype N] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] : IsTotal (N := N) (A := A) plurality
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.plurality_isTotal`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.plurality_isTotal← SocialChoice.Voting.plurality_isTotal (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/VotingRules.lean:236): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 5
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.pluralityPlurality rule.
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsTotalA voting rule is total if it always returns at least one winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.pluralityScorePlurality score vector.
- SocialChoice.Voting.scoringRule_isTotalSocialChoice.Voting.scoringRule_isTotal
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Classical in open Finset in open scoped BigOperators in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.plurality_isTotal [Fintype N] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] : IsTotal (N := N) (A := A) plurality := scoringRule_isTotal pluralityScore