SocialChoice.Voting.IsTotal
defimported Lean
A voting rule is total if it always returns at least one winner.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in def SocialChoice.Voting.IsTotal [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (f : VotingRule N A) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.IsTotal`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.IsTotal← SocialChoice.Voting.IsTotal (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:212): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRuleA set-valued voting rule on fixed finite voter and candidate types.
- Used by 6
- SocialChoice.Voting.copeland_isTotalSocialChoice.Voting.copeland_isTotal
- SocialChoice.Voting.veto_isTotalSocialChoice.Voting.veto_isTotal
- SocialChoice.Voting.plurality_isTotalSocialChoice.Voting.plurality_isTotal
- SocialChoice.Voting.borda_isTotalSocialChoice.Voting.borda_isTotal
- SocialChoice.Voting.scoringRule_isTotalSocialChoice.Voting.scoringRule_isTotal
- SocialChoice.Voting.top_unanimity_of_unanimityTop unanimity follows from weak-Pareto unanimity plus totality: if every voter ranks
afirst, thenais the unique winner.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in /-- A voting rule is total if it always returns at least one winner. -/ def SocialChoice.Voting.IsTotal [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (f : VotingRule N A) : Prop := ∀ P : Profile N A, (f P).Nonempty