SocialChoice.Voting.scoringRule_isTotal
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.scoringRule_isTotal
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Classical in open Finset in open scoped BigOperators in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.scoringRule_isTotal (score : Nat → Nat → Int) [Fintype N] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] : IsTotal (N := N) (A := A) (scoringRule score)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.scoringRule_isTotal`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.scoringRule_isTotal← SocialChoice.Voting.scoringRule_isTotal (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/VotingRules.lean:205): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 5
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.scoringRuleGeneric positional scoring rule. The first argument is the number of alternatives, and the second is the zero-based rank.
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsTotalA voting rule is total if it always returns at least one winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.scoringWinners_nonemptySocialChoice.Voting.scoringWinners_nonempty
- Used by 3
- SocialChoice.Voting.veto_isTotalSocialChoice.Voting.veto_isTotal
- SocialChoice.Voting.plurality_isTotalSocialChoice.Voting.plurality_isTotal
- SocialChoice.Voting.borda_isTotalSocialChoice.Voting.borda_isTotal
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Classical inopen Finset inopen scoped BigOperators invariable {N A : Type*} intheorem SocialChoice.Voting.scoringRule_isTotal (score : Nat → Nat → Int) [Fintype N] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] : IsTotal (N := N) (A := A) (scoringRule score) := by intro P simpa [scoringRule] using scoringWinners_nonempty (P := P) (score := fun r => score (Fintype.card A) r)