walrasian_expenditure_ge_of_utility_ge
In a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent and finite, nonempty commodity type Good, if price vector p has strictly positive prices, agent i has a strictly monotone utility function, and (p, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium, then for any non-negative consumption bundle y such that agent i weakly prefers y to x_i (that is, E.utility i (x i) ≤ E.utility i y), the market expenditure on y is at least the value of agent i's initial endowment (that is, ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g ≤ ∑ g, p g * y g).
Statement
theorem walrasian_expenditure_ge_of_utility_ge {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent] [Fintype Good] [Nonempty Good] (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (p : Good → ℝ) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ) (i : Agent) (hp : ∀ g, 0 < p g) (h_mono : StrictMono (E.utility i)) (h_walras : is_walrasian_equilibrium E p x) (y : Good → ℝ) (hy_nonneg : ∀ g, 0 ≤ y g) (hy_u : E.utility i (x i) ≤ E.utility i y) : ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g ≤ ∑ g, p g * y g
- Source
- Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, Proposition 16.C.1 (Step 2)
- Verified
- 01 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 2
- ExchangeEconomyA pure exchange economy with agent type Agent and commodity type Good consists of a non-negative initial endowment of each good for each…
- is_walrasian_equilibriumIn a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent and finite commodities Good, a price vector p : Good → ℝ and an allocation x : Agent…
- Used by 1
- first_welfare_theoremThe First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: in a pure exchange economy E with finite, nonempty agent type Agent and finite,…
Read back from the Lean
For any finite types Agent and Good where Good is nonempty, let E be an exchange economy (with non-negative endowments E.endowment : Agent → Good → ℝ and utility functions E.utility : Agent → (Good → ℝ) → ℝ). Let p : Good → ℝ be a price vector, x : Agent → Good → ℝ an allocation, and i : Agent an agent. Assume that:
1. Every good has strictly positive price: ∀ g : Good, 0 < p g.
2. Agent i's utility function is strictly monotone: StrictMono (E.utility i) (with respect to the pointwise partial order on Good → ℝ).
3. (p, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium for E.
Then, for any bundle y : Good → ℝ, if:
4. y is non-negative: ∀ g : Good, 0 ≤ y g, and
5. Agent i weakly prefers y to their equilibrium allocation x i: E.utility i (x i) ≤ E.utility i y,
it follows that the value of agent i's endowment under p does not exceed the expenditure of bundle y under p:
∑ g : Good, p g * E.endowment i g ≤ ∑ g : Good, p g * y g.
Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.
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/-- Under strictly monotone utility and strictly positive prices, any non-negative bundle weakly preferred to the equilibrium bundle costs at least the endowment value. -/theorem walrasian_expenditure_ge_of_utility_ge {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent] [Fintype Good] [Nonempty Good] (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (p : Good → ℝ) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ) (i : Agent) (hp : ∀ g, 0 < p g) (h_mono : StrictMono (E.utility i)) (h_walras : is_walrasian_equilibrium E p x) (y : Good → ℝ) (hy_nonneg : ∀ g, 0 ≤ y g) (hy_u : E.utility i (x i) ≤ E.utility i y) : ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g ≤ ∑ g, p g * y g := by have h_max := (h_walras.2 i).2 by_contra! hlt set n : ℝ := (Fintype.card Good : ℝ) have hn : 0 < n := Nat.cast_pos.mpr Fintype.card_pos set Δ := ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g - ∑ g, p g * y g have hΔ : 0 < Δ := sub_pos.mpr hlt set c := Δ / n have hc : 0 < c := div_pos hΔ hn set z : Good → ℝ := fun g => y g + c / p g have hpz : ∀ g, p g * z g = p g * y g + c := by intro g dsimp [z] rw [mul_add, mul_div_cancel₀ _ (ne_of_gt (hp g))] have hsum : ∑ g, p g * z g = ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g := by simp_rw [hpz, Finset.sum_add_distrib, Finset.sum_const, nsmul_eq_mul] have : (Finset.univ.card : ℝ) = n := rfl rw [this, mul_div_cancel₀ _ (ne_of_gt hn)] exact add_sub_cancel _ _ have hyz_gt : ∀ g, y g < z g := by intro g dsimp [z] have : 0 < c / p g := div_pos hc (hp g) linarith have hz_nonneg : ∀ g, 0 ≤ z g := by intro g exact le_trans (hy_nonneg g) (le_of_lt (hyz_gt g)) have hyz_lt : y < z := by rw [lt_iff_le_and_ne] refine ⟨fun g => le_of_lt (hyz_gt g), ?_⟩ intro h_eq obtain ⟨g0⟩ := ‹Nonempty Good› have h1 : y g0 = z g0 := congr_fun h_eq g0 have h2 : y g0 < z g0 := hyz_gt g0 linarith have h_util_lt : E.utility i y < E.utility i z := h_mono hyz_lt have h_util_le : E.utility i z ≤ E.utility i (x i) := h_max z hz_nonneg (le_of_eq hsum) linarith