AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

walrasian_expenditure_ge_of_utility_ge

theoremverified

In a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent and finite, nonempty commodity type Good, if price vector p has strictly positive prices, agent i has a strictly monotone utility function, and (p, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium, then for any non-negative consumption bundle y such that agent i weakly prefers y to x_i (that is, E.utility i (x i) ≤ E.utility i y), the market expenditure on y is at least the value of agent i's initial endowment (that is, ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g ≤ ∑ g, p g * y g).

Statement

theorem walrasian_expenditure_ge_of_utility_ge
    {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent] [Fintype Good] [Nonempty Good]
    (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (p : Good → ℝ) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ)
    (i : Agent)
    (hp : ∀ g, 0 < p g)
    (h_mono : StrictMono (E.utility i))
    (h_walras : is_walrasian_equilibrium E p x)
    (y : Good → ℝ) (hy_nonneg : ∀ g, 0 ≤ y g)
    (hy_u : E.utility i (x i) ≤ E.utility i y) :
    ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g ≤ ∑ g, p g * y g
Source
Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, Proposition 16.C.1 (Step 2)
Verified
01 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 2
  • ExchangeEconomyA pure exchange economy with agent type Agent and commodity type Good consists of a non-negative initial endowment of each good for each…
  • is_walrasian_equilibriumIn a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent and finite commodities Good, a price vector p : Good → ℝ and an allocation x : Agent…
Used by 1
  • first_welfare_theoremThe First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: in a pure exchange economy E with finite, nonempty agent type Agent and finite,…

Read back from the Lean

For any finite types Agent and Good where Good is nonempty, let E be an exchange economy (with non-negative endowments E.endowment : Agent → Good → ℝ and utility functions E.utility : Agent → (Good → ℝ) → ℝ). Let p : Good → ℝ be a price vector, x : Agent → Good → ℝ an allocation, and i : Agent an agent. Assume that: 1. Every good has strictly positive price: ∀ g : Good, 0 < p g. 2. Agent i's utility function is strictly monotone: StrictMono (E.utility i) (with respect to the pointwise partial order on Good → ℝ). 3. (p, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium for E. Then, for any bundle y : Good → ℝ, if: 4. y is non-negative: ∀ g : Good, 0 ≤ y g, and 5. Agent i weakly prefers y to their equilibrium allocation x i: E.utility i (x i) ≤ E.utility i y, it follows that the value of agent i's endowment under p does not exceed the expenditure of bundle y under p: ∑ g : Good, p g * E.endowment i g ≤ ∑ g : Good, p g * y g.

Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- Under strictly monotone utility and strictly positive prices, any non-negative bundle weakly preferred to the equilibrium bundle costs at least the endowment value. -/theorem walrasian_expenditure_ge_of_utility_ge    {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent] [Fintype Good] [Nonempty Good]    (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (p : Good → ℝ) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ)    (i : Agent)    (hp : ∀ g, 0 < p g)    (h_mono : StrictMono (E.utility i))    (h_walras : is_walrasian_equilibrium E p x)    (y : Good → ℝ) (hy_nonneg : ∀ g, 0 ≤ y g)    (hy_u : E.utility i (x i) ≤ E.utility i y) :    ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g ≤ ∑ g, p g * y g := by  have h_max := (h_walras.2 i).2  by_contra! hlt  set n : ℝ := (Fintype.card Good : ℝ)  have hn : 0 < n := Nat.cast_pos.mpr Fintype.card_pos  set Δ := ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g - ∑ g, p g * y g  have hΔ : 0 < Δ := sub_pos.mpr hlt  set c := Δ / n  have hc : 0 < c := div_pos hΔ hn  set z : Good → ℝ := fun g => y g + c / p g  have hpz : ∀ g, p g * z g = p g * y g + c := by    intro g    dsimp [z]    rw [mul_add, mul_div_cancel₀ _ (ne_of_gt (hp g))]  have hsum : ∑ g, p g * z g = ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g := by    simp_rw [hpz, Finset.sum_add_distrib, Finset.sum_const, nsmul_eq_mul]    have : (Finset.univ.card : ℝ) = n := rfl    rw [this, mul_div_cancel₀ _ (ne_of_gt hn)]    exact add_sub_cancel _ _  have hyz_gt : ∀ g, y g < z g := by    intro g    dsimp [z]    have : 0 < c / p g := div_pos hc (hp g)    linarith  have hz_nonneg : ∀ g, 0 ≤ z g := by    intro g    exact le_trans (hy_nonneg g) (le_of_lt (hyz_gt g))  have hyz_lt : y < z := by    rw [lt_iff_le_and_ne]    refine ⟨fun g => le_of_lt (hyz_gt g), ?_⟩    intro h_eq    obtain ⟨g0⟩ := ‹Nonempty Good›    have h1 : y g0 = z g0 := congr_fun h_eq g0    have h2 : y g0 < z g0 := hyz_gt g0    linarith  have h_util_lt : E.utility i y < E.utility i z := h_mono hyz_lt  have h_util_le : E.utility i z ≤ E.utility i (x i) := h_max z hz_nonneg (le_of_eq hsum)  linarith
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