AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

walrasian_expenditure_gt_of_utility_gt

theoremverified

In a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent and finite commodities Good, if (p, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium, then for any agent i and any non-negative consumption bundle y such that agent i strictly prefers y to x_i (that is, E.utility i (x i) < E.utility i y), the market expenditure on y strictly exceeds the value of agent i's initial endowment (that is, ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g < ∑ g, p g * y g).

Statement

theorem walrasian_expenditure_gt_of_utility_gt
    {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent] [Fintype Good]
    (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (p : Good → ℝ) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ)
    (h_walras : is_walrasian_equilibrium E p x) (i : Agent)
    (y : Good → ℝ) (hy_nonneg : ∀ g, 0 ≤ y g)
    (hy_u : E.utility i (x i) < E.utility i y) :
    ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g < ∑ g, p g * y g
Source
Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, Proposition 16.C.1 (Step 1)
Verified
01 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 2
  • ExchangeEconomyA pure exchange economy with agent type Agent and commodity type Good consists of a non-negative initial endowment of each good for each…
  • is_walrasian_equilibriumIn a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent and finite commodities Good, a price vector p : Good → ℝ and an allocation x : Agent…
Used by 1
  • first_welfare_theoremThe First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: in a pure exchange economy E with finite, nonempty agent type Agent and finite,…

Read back from the Lean

Let Agent and Good be finite types. Let E be an exchange economy with agents Agent and goods Good, p : Good → ℝ be a price vector, and x : Agent → Good → ℝ be an allocation. Assume that (p, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium for E. Let i : Agent be an agent, and let y : Good → ℝ be a consumption bundle such that 0 ≤ y g for all g : Good. If agent i strictly prefers y to their equilibrium allocation x i (that is, E.utility i (x i) < E.utility i y), then the expenditure on bundle y at prices p is strictly greater than the value of agent i's endowment at prices p (that is, ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g < ∑ g, p g * y g).

Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- In a Walrasian equilibrium, any non-negative bundle giving strictly greater utility costs strictly more than the agent's endowment. -/theorem walrasian_expenditure_gt_of_utility_gt    {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent] [Fintype Good]    (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (p : Good → ℝ) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ)    (h_walras : is_walrasian_equilibrium E p x) (i : Agent)    (y : Good → ℝ) (hy_nonneg : ∀ g, 0 ≤ y g)    (hy_u : E.utility i (x i) < E.utility i y) :    ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g < ∑ g, p g * y g := by  by_contra h_not  have h_le : ∑ g, p g * y g ≤ ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g := le_of_not_gt h_not  have h_opt := h_walras.2 i  have h_u_le := h_opt.2 y hy_nonneg h_le  exact not_le_of_gt hy_u h_u_le
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