walrasian_expenditure_gt_of_utility_gt
In a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent and finite commodities Good, if (p, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium, then for any agent i and any non-negative consumption bundle y such that agent i strictly prefers y to x_i (that is, E.utility i (x i) < E.utility i y), the market expenditure on y strictly exceeds the value of agent i's initial endowment (that is, ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g < ∑ g, p g * y g).
Statement
theorem walrasian_expenditure_gt_of_utility_gt {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent] [Fintype Good] (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (p : Good → ℝ) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ) (h_walras : is_walrasian_equilibrium E p x) (i : Agent) (y : Good → ℝ) (hy_nonneg : ∀ g, 0 ≤ y g) (hy_u : E.utility i (x i) < E.utility i y) : ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g < ∑ g, p g * y g
- Source
- Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, Proposition 16.C.1 (Step 1)
- Verified
- 01 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 2
- ExchangeEconomyA pure exchange economy with agent type Agent and commodity type Good consists of a non-negative initial endowment of each good for each…
- is_walrasian_equilibriumIn a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent and finite commodities Good, a price vector p : Good → ℝ and an allocation x : Agent…
- Used by 1
- first_welfare_theoremThe First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: in a pure exchange economy E with finite, nonempty agent type Agent and finite,…
Read back from the Lean
Let Agent and Good be finite types. Let E be an exchange economy with agents Agent and goods Good, p : Good → ℝ be a price vector, and x : Agent → Good → ℝ be an allocation. Assume that (p, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium for E. Let i : Agent be an agent, and let y : Good → ℝ be a consumption bundle such that 0 ≤ y g for all g : Good. If agent i strictly prefers y to their equilibrium allocation x i (that is, E.utility i (x i) < E.utility i y), then the expenditure on bundle y at prices p is strictly greater than the value of agent i's endowment at prices p (that is, ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g < ∑ g, p g * y g).
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/-- In a Walrasian equilibrium, any non-negative bundle giving strictly greater utility costs strictly more than the agent's endowment. -/theorem walrasian_expenditure_gt_of_utility_gt {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent] [Fintype Good] (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (p : Good → ℝ) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ) (h_walras : is_walrasian_equilibrium E p x) (i : Agent) (y : Good → ℝ) (hy_nonneg : ∀ g, 0 ≤ y g) (hy_u : E.utility i (x i) < E.utility i y) : ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g < ∑ g, p g * y g := by by_contra h_not have h_le : ∑ g, p g * y g ≤ ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g := le_of_not_gt h_not have h_opt := h_walras.2 i have h_u_le := h_opt.2 y hy_nonneg h_le exact not_le_of_gt hy_u h_u_le