Auction.FirstPrice.game
defimported Lean
First-price auction as a strategic game. This is also the game induced by mechanism via MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame; see game_eq_toStrategicGame.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in variable {v : I → U} in noncomputable def Auction.FirstPrice.game (v : I → U) : EconCSLib.StrategicGame I U
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `Auction.FirstPrice.game`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.FirstPrice.game← Auction.FirstPrice.game (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/FirstPrice.lean:98): adapted
What was changed in
Auction.FirstPrice.game--- EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/FirstPrice.lean:98 (Auction.FirstPrice.game) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ -/-- First-price auction as a strategic game. - - This is also the game induced by `mechanism` via `MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame`; - see `game_eq_toStrategicGame`. -/ -noncomputable def game (v : I → U) : StrategicGame I U where +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in +variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in +variable {v : I → U} in +noncomputable def Auction.FirstPrice.game (v : I → U) : EconCSLib.StrategicGame I U where strategy := fun _ => U - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 3
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - Auction.FirstPrice.utilityUtility of bidder
iin a first-price auction: winner getsv i − b i(pays own bid), losers get0. - MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGameThe strategic game induced by a transfer mechanism and an external utility rule. Utility is supplied as a function of: - allocation -…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
- Used by 2
- Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame
game vequals the strategic game induced bymechanism. The payoffs agree becausepaymentRule b i = if i = winner b then b i else 0,… - Auction.FirstPrice.no_dominant_strategyNo dominant strategy exists in first-price auctions. For any bidder
iand any bidbi, there exists a profile where biddingbiis…
- Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in variable {v : I → U} in /-- First-price auction as a strategic game. This is also the game induced by `mechanism` via `MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame`; see `game_eq_toStrategicGame`. -/ noncomputable def Auction.FirstPrice.game (v : I → U) : EconCSLib.StrategicGame I U where strategy := fun _ => U payoff b i := utility v b i