AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Auction.FirstPrice.mechanism

defimported Lean

The first-price auction as a MechanismWithTransfers. Agents report bids in U (their type space is homogeneous: T i = U). - Allocation: the winner index (element of I) - Payments: the winner pays their own bid b i; all losers pay 0.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in
variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
variable {v : I → U} in
noncomputable def Auction.FirstPrice.mechanism : MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => U) I U
Defined in
EconCSLib, `Auction.FirstPrice.mechanism`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • Auction.FirstPrice.winnerThe winner of the first-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses Auction.argmaxBid from…
  • MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. - I — agents - T — report/type space of each agent - A — allocation space - P — payment space…
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in
variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
variable {v : I → U} in
/-- The first-price auction as a `MechanismWithTransfers`. Agents report bids in `U` (their type space is homogeneous: `T i = U`). - Allocation: the winner index (element of `I`) - Payments: the winner pays their own bid `b i`; all losers pay `0`. -/
noncomputable def Auction.FirstPrice.mechanism : MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => U) I U where
  allocationRule b := winner b
  paymentRule b i := if i = winner b then b i else 0
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